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The labor market effects of introducing unemployment benefits in an economy with high informality

机译:在高度非正规经济中引入失业救济的劳动力市场效应

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Unemployment benefit systems are nonexistent in many developing economies. Introducing such systems poses many challenges which are partly due to the high level of informality in the labor markets of these economies. This paper studies the consequences on the labor market of implementing an unemployment benefit system in economies with large informal sectors and high flows of workers between formality and informality. We build a search and matching model with endogenous destruction, on-the-job search, and intersectoral flows, where agents in the economy decide optimally whether or not to formalize jobs. We calibrate the model for Mexico, and show that the introduction of an unemployment benefit system, where workers contribute when employed in the formal market and collect benefits when they lose their jobs, even if they obtain informal jobs, can lead to an increase in formality in the economy, while also producing small increases in unemployment. The exact impact of incorporating such benefits depends on the relative strength of two opposing effects: the generosity of the benefits and the level of the contributions that finance those benefits. We also show important policy complementarities with other interventions in the labor market. In particular, combining the unemployment benefit program with policies that reduce the cost of formality, such as lower employment taxes and firing costs, can produce greater decreases in informality and lower impacts on unemployment than when the program is applied in isolation. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:许多发展中经济体不存在失业救济金制度。引入这样的系统带来了许多挑战,部分原因是这些经济体的劳动力市场中的高度非正规性。本文研究了在非正式部门规模较大,正规和非正式之间的劳动力大量流动的经济体中实施失业救济金制度对劳动力市场的影响。我们建立了具有内生破坏,在职搜索和部门间流动的搜索和匹配模型,经济中的代理人可以最佳地决定是否正规化工作。我们对墨西哥的模型进行了校准,并显示出引入失业救济金制度,即工人在正式市场工作时会做出贡献,而即使他们找到了非正式工作,也能在失去工作时领取失业金,这会导致正式性的提高。在经济中,同时也会导致失业人数的小幅增加。合并此类利益的确切影响取决于两个相反影响的相对强度:利益的慷慨和为这些利益提供资金的捐款水平。我们还显示出与劳动力市场其他干预措施之间重要的政策互补性。尤其是,将失业救济金计划与降低手续成本的政策(例如降低就业税和解雇费用)相结合,与单独实施该计划相比,可以大大减少非正式行为,并减少对失业的影响。 (C)2014 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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