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首页> 外文期刊>Evolution and Human Behavior >Reputation-based partner choice is an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity in solving social dilemmas
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Reputation-based partner choice is an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity in solving social dilemmas

机译：基于声誉的合作伙伴选择是解决社会困境时间接互惠的有效替代方法

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When group interests clash with individual ones, maintaining cooperation poses a problem. However, cooperation can be facilitated by introducing reputational incentives. Through indirect reciprocity, people who cooperate in a social dilemma are more likely to receive cooperative acts from others. Another mechanism that enhances group cooperation is reputation-based partner choice, or competitive altruism. According to this framework, cooperators benefit via increased access to cooperative partners. Our study compared the effectiveness of indirect reciprocity and competitive altruism in re-establishing cooperation after the typical decline found during repeated public goods games. Twenty groups of four participants first played a series of public goods games, which confirmed the expected decline. Subsequently, public goods games were alternated with either indirect reciprocity games (in which participants had an opportunity to give to another individual from whom they would never receive a direct return) or competitive altruism games (in which they could choose partners for directly reciprocal interactions). We found that public goods game contributions increased when interspersed with competitive altruism games; they were also higher than in public goods games interspersed with indirect reciprocity games. Investing in reputation by increasing contributions to public goods was a profitable strategy in that it increased returns in subsequent competitive altruism and indirect reciprocity games. There was also some evidence that these returns were greater under competitive altruism than indirect reciprocity. Our findings indicate that strategic reputation building through competitive altruism provides an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity as a means for restoring cooperation in social dilemmas. (c) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机译：当团体利益与个人利益发生冲突时，维持合作就成为一个问题。但是，可以通过引入声誉奖励来促进合作。通过间接的互惠，在社会困境中合作的人们更有可能从他人那里获得合作行为。增强团队合作的另一种机制是基于声誉的合作伙伴选择或竞争利他主义。根据此框架，合作者可通过增加与合作伙伴的联系而受益。我们的研究比较了间接的互惠和竞争利他主义在反复的公共物品博弈中发现的典型下降之后重建合作的有效性。 20人一组的四个参与者首先参加了一系列公益活动，这证实了预期的下降。随后，将公益游戏与间接互惠游戏（参与者有机会给予永远不会从中获得回报的另一个人）或竞争性利他主义游戏（其中他们可以选择合作伙伴进行直接互惠）交替使用。我们发现，在与竞争性利他主义游戏一起穿插时，公益游戏的贡献会增加。它们还高于穿插有间接互惠游戏的公益游戏。通过增加对公共产品的贡献来投资声誉是一种有利可图的策略，因为它可以增加随后的竞争利他主义和间接互惠游戏的回报。还有证据表明，在竞争利他主义下，这些回报要比间接互惠更大。我们的研究结果表明，通过竞争利他主义建立战略声​​誉可以替代间接互惠作为恢复社会困境中合作的一种有效方式。 （c）2013 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。

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