...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Management science: Journal of the Institute of Management Sciences >Does Brand Licensing Increase a Licensor's Shareholder Value?
【24h】

Does Brand Licensing Increase a Licensor's Shareholder Value?

机译：品牌授权会增加授权人的股东价值吗？

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
   

获取外文期刊封面封底 >>

       
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This study examines 171 brand licensing announcements and subsequent changes in the licensor firms' shareholder values using the event study method. We find that although brand licensing announcements lead to positive abnormal returns on average, nearly 44% of the announcements in our sample are followed by negative abnormal returns. We argue that investors react more favorably to a brand licensing announcement when they believe (i) the brand has greater ability to stimulate licensee product sales (and thus generate higher royalties for the licensor) and (ii) the licensor firm has greater ability to limit licensee opportunism (and thus limit brand dilution and its adverse effect on sales of other products marketed under the brand name). In line with our hypotheses related to a brand's ability to stimulate licensee product sales, the study's findings suggest that investors react more favorably to announcements involving brands with greater brand fit and greater brand breadth. However, investors appear to react less favorably to announcements involving brands with higher advertising investments. In line with our hypotheses related to a licensor firm's ability to limit licensee opportunism, the study's findings suggest that investors react more favorably to announcements involving larger licensors; however, investors' reactions do not appear to be influenced by licensor firms' licensing experience.
机译：本研究使用事件研究方法研究了171个品牌许可公告以及许可人公司股东价值的后续变化。我们发现，尽管品牌许可公告平均会带来正的异常收益，但在我们样本中，将近44％的公告之后是负的异常收益。我们认为，当投资者相信（i）该品牌具有更大的能力来刺激被许可人的产品销售（从而为许可人产生更高的特许权使用费）并且（ii）许可人的公司具有更大的限制能力时，他们会对品牌许可公告做出更有利的反应。被许可人的机会主义（从而限制品牌稀释及其对以该品牌名称销售的其他产品的销售的不利影响）。根据我们与品牌刺激被许可人产品销售能力有关的假设，该研究结果表明，投资者对涉及品牌更贴合和品牌更广的品牌的公告做出更有利的反应。但是，投资者似乎对广告投资较高的品牌的公告反应较差。根据我们与许可人公司限制被许可人机会主义能力有关的假设，该研究结果表明，投资者对涉及更大的许可人的公告做出更有利的反应。但是，投资者的反应似乎不受许可公司的许可经验的影响。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号