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Some asymptotic results in discounted repeated games of one-sided incomplete information

机译：单边不完整信息打折重复博弈的一些渐近结果

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The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payoffs. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient, relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payoffs is essentially the same as that in the undiscounted case. This implies that even small amounts of incomplete information can lead to a discontinuous change in the equilibrium payoff set. For the case of equal discount factors, however, and under an assumption that strictly individually rational payoffs exist, a result akin to the Folk Theorem holds when a complete information game is perturbed by a small amount of incomplete information. [References: 13]
机译：本文分析了两人打折重复博弈的纳什均衡，该博弈具有单方面的不完全信息和已知的收益。如果知情玩家相对于不知情的玩家是任意耐心的，那么知情玩家的收益的表征本质上与不打折情况下的表征相同。这意味着即使少量的不完整信息也会导致均衡收益集的不连续变化。但是，对于折现因子相等的情况，并假设存在严格的个人合理收益，当一个完整的信息博弈受到少量的不完整信息的干扰时，类似于民间定理的结果成立。 [参考：13]

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