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首页> 外文期刊>Managerial and decision economics: The international journal of research and progress in management economics >Incentives and Selection in Promotion Contests: Is It Possible to Kill Two Birds with One Stone?
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Incentives and Selection in Promotion Contests: Is It Possible to Kill Two Birds with One Stone?

机译：促销比赛中的奖励措施和选择：有可能用一块石头杀死两只鸟吗？

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摘要

This paper investigates whether a designer can improve both the incentive provision and the selection performance of a promotion contest by making the competition more (or less) dynamic. A comparison of static (one-stage) and dynamic (two-stage) contests reveals that this is not the case. A structural change that improves the performance in one dimension leads to a deterioration in the other dimension. This suggests that modifications of the contest structure are an alternative to strategic handicaps. A key advantage of structural handicaps over participant-specific ones is that the implementation of the former does not require prior identification of worker types.
机译：本文研究了设计师是否可以通过使竞争更具（或更少）动态性来改善促销活动的激励条件和选择性能。对静态（一级）和动态（两级）竞赛的比较表明，事实并非如此。在一个维度上提高性能的结构更改会导致另一个维度上的性能下降。这表明对比赛结构的修改可以替代战略障碍。相较于特定于参与者的结构性障碍，结构性障碍的主要优势在于前者的实施不需要事先确定工人类型。

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