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首页> 外文期刊>Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte >History Without Causality. How Contemporary Historical Epistemology Demarcates Itself From the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
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History Without Causality. How Contemporary Historical Epistemology Demarcates Itself From the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

机译：没有因果关系的历史。当代历史认识论如何与科学知识社会学划清界限

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History Without Causality. How Contemporary Historical Epistemology Demarcates Itself From the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. Contemporary proponents of historical epistemology often try to delimit their enterprise by demarcating it from the sociology of scientific knowledge and other sociologically oriented approaches in the history of science. Their criticism is directed against the use of causal explanations which are deemed to invite reductionism and lead to a totalizing perspective on science. In the present article I want to analyse this line of criticism in what I consider are two paradigmatic works of contemporary historical epistemology: Lorraine Daston's und Peter Galison's Objectivity and Hans-J?rg Rheinberger's Toward a History of Epistemic Things. I first present their arguments against the sociological and causal analysis of scientific knowledge and practice and then try to defend sociological work in the history of science against their charges. I will, however, not do so by defending causal explanations directly. Rather, I will show that the arguments against sociological analysis put forward in contemporary historical epistemology, as well as historical epistemology's own models of historical explanation and narration, bear problematic consequences. I argue that Daston, Galison and Rheinberger fail to create productive resonances between macro- and microhistorical perspectives, that they reproduce an internalist picture of scientific knowledge, and finally that Rheinberger's attempt to deconstruct the dichotomy between subject and object leads him to neglect questions about the political dimension of scientific research.
机译：没有因果关系的历史。当代历史认识论如何与科学知识社会学划清界限。历史认识论的当代拥护者常常试图通过将其与科学知识的社会学以及科学史上其他面向社会学的方法区分开来来划定他们的事业。他们的批评是针对因果关系解释的使用，因果关系解释被认为会引起还原论并导致对科学的全面认识。在本文中，我想分析一下我认为是当代历史认识论的两种范式的批评：洛林·达斯顿（Lorraine Daston）和彼得·加里森（Peter Galison）的客观性以及汉斯·勒格·莱茵伯格（Hans-J？rg Rheinberger）的《走向认识事物的历史》。我首先提出他们反对科学知识和实践的社会学和因果分析的论据，然后试图捍卫科学史上的社会学工作不受其指控。但是，我不会直接捍卫因果关系的解释。相反，我将证明，当代历史认识论中提出的反对社会学分析的论点，以及历史认识论自己的历史解释和叙述模型，都将产生令人担忧的后果。我认为，达斯顿，加利森和莱茵伯格未能在宏观和微观历史观点之间产生富有成效的共鸣，它们再现了科学知识的内在主义图景，最后，莱茵伯格试图解构主体与客体二分法的尝试导致他忽略了有关科学知识的问题。科学研究的政治层面。

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