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首页> 外文期刊>Biological Theory: integrating development, evolution & cognition >Dishonest Signaling in Vertebrate Eusociality
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Dishonest Signaling in Vertebrate Eusociality

机译：脊椎动物善意的不诚实信号

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I propose that a dishonest signaling system can be evolutionarily stable in eusocial animal societies if the amount of dishonesty is balanced by the chance of non-reproductive workers to advance to the reproductive caste in the future. I express this trade-off in a modified form of Hamilton's rule, where I distinguish between the real and perceived cost of an altruistic act, and between the real and perceived genetic relatedness between colony members. Furthermore, I elaborate how the vertebrate neuromodulator oxytocin could serve as an internal representation of the perceived cost of an altruistic act and of perceived relatedness. Behavioral and receptor localization data support this hypothesis. The encoding of cost and relatedness by oxytocin is likely integrated with a number of other functions related to social bonding. I conclude with a discussion of honesty in signaling, an outline of testable consequences of this hypothesis, and a comparison between vertebrate and insect eusociality
机译：我建议，如果不诚实的信号量由非生殖工作者将来晋升为生殖种姓的机会所平衡，那么在不道德的动物社会中，不诚实的信号系统可以在进化上保持稳定。我用汉密尔顿法则的修改形式表达了这种权衡，其中我区分了利他行为的实际成本和感知成本，以及群体成员之间的真实和感知遗传关系。此外，我详细阐述了脊椎动物神经调节剂催产素如何作为利他行为的感知成本和感知的相关性的内部表示。行为和受体定位数据支持这一假设。催产素对成本和相关性的编码可能与许多其他与社会纽带相关的功能整合在一起。最后，我讨论了信号传递中的诚实度，该假设可测结果的概述以及脊椎动物与昆虫的礼节性的比较

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