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Does privatization of solid waste and water services reduce costs? A review of empirical studies

机译:固体废物和水服务的私有化是否会降低成本?实证研究综述

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Cost reduction was the key benefit claimed by privatization. We conduct a review of all Published econometric studies of water and waste production since 1970. Little support is found for a link between privatization and cost savings. Cost savings are not found in water delivery and are not systematic in waste. Reviewed Studies build from public choice, property rights, transaction costs and industrial organization theories. We conclude public choice theory is too focused oil competition, which is typically nor present in quasi-markets. Property rights theory gives attention to ownership and service quality, but absent competition, ownership makes little difference oil costs borne by municipalities. Transaction costs argue privatization is best when contracts are complete-a rare situation in public service markets. We find the industrial organization approach most useful in explaining results because it directly addresses incentives, sector Structure and regulatory framework. Overall, the empirical results show the importance of market Structure, industrial organization of the service sector, and government management, oversight and regulation. Because there is no systematic optimal choice between public and private delivery, managers should approach the issue in a pragmatic way. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译:降低成本是私有化声称的主要好处。我们对1970年以来所有已发布的关于水和废物生产的计量经济学研究进行了回顾。对于私有化与节省成本之间的联系,几乎找不到支持。节约成本在输水过程中找不到,在浪费中也不是系统的。复习研究基于公共选择,产权,交易成本和行业组织理论。我们得出结论,公共选择理论过于关注石油竞争,在准市场中通常是不存在的。产权理论关注所有权和服务质量,但是在缺乏竞争的情况下,所有权对市政负担的石油成本影响不大。交易成本认为,在合同完成时私有化是最好的,这是公共服务市场中罕见的情况。我们发现行业组织方法在解释结果方面最有用,因为它直接解决了激励措施,行业结构和监管框架。总体而言,实证结果表明市场结构,服务业的行业组织以及政府管理,监督和监管的重要性。由于在公共交付和私人交付之间没有系统的最佳选择,因此管理人员应以务实的方式解决这一问题。 (C)2008 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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