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Limits of economic and strategic rationality for agents and MA systems

机译：代理商和MA系统的经济和战略合理性限制

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Al adoption of the game-theoretic paradigm although motivated and productive, suffers from basiclimits for modelling autonomous agents and MA systems. First, we briefly restate game-theory's rolefor DAI and MAS: the introduction of formal prototypical social situations ("games"); the use offormal and sound notions, a self-interested view of autonomous agents, etc. Then, a number ofcriticisms, that have an impact on modelling intelligent social/individual action, are examined: theeconomicist interpretation of rationality; its instrumentalist conception, which leaves implicit the endsof agents' choices; the consequent multiple equilibria allowed by the theory; the context-unboundedness of rationality. Some contributions for a more heterarchic, context-bounded,architecture of rational agent are given, and a goal-based strategy, as distinct from a strictly utilitarianprinciple of decision-making, is proposed. Troubles of game-theory with multi-agent systems and inparticular with modelling "cooperation" are outlined. Finally, some limits inherent in the notion of"incentive engineering" are pointed out.
机译：博弈论范式的采用虽然是有动机和富有成效的，但它在建模自治主体和MA系统方面存在一些基本限制。首先，我们简要重申游戏理论对DAI和MAS的作用：正式原型社会情境的引入（“游戏”）;然后，研究了对智能社会/个人行为建模有影响的许多批评：经济学家对合理性的解释;它的工具主义概念，隐含了代理商选择的目的;该理论所允许的结果多重均衡;理性的上下文无限。提出了一些对于多层次，有上下文约束的理性主体体系结构的贡献，并提出了一种与严格的功利主义决策原则不同的基于目标的策略。概述了具有多智能体系统的博弈论的问题，尤其是建模“合作”的问题。最后，指出了“激励工程”概念中固有的一些限制。

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