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Dynamic Hotelling duopoly with linear transportation costs

机译：具有线性运输成本的动态Hotelling双头垄断

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摘要

I investigate a spatial duopoly model with linear transportation costs as a differential game where product differentiation is the result of firms' R&D investments. Two related results obtain, i.e. (i) the steady-state R&D investment (product differentiation) is negatively (positively) related to the cost of capital and time discounting; and (ii) if time discounting and the cost of capital are sufficiently high, the amount of differentiation observed in steady state is sufficiently large to ensure the existence of a unique pure-strategy price equilibrium with prices above marginal cost. The range of time discounting wherein the game produces a price equilibrium in pure strategies is wider under the closed loop solution than under the open loop solution.
机译：我将线性运输成本的空间双寡头模型作为一个差分博弈进行研究，其中产品差异是企业研发投资的结果。获得两个相关的结果，即：（i）稳态R＆D投资（产品差异化）与资本成本和时间折扣成负（正）相关; （ii）如果时间折扣和资本成本足够高，则在稳态下观察到的差异量就足够大，以确保存在价格高于边际成本的独特的纯策略价格均衡。在纯策略中游戏产生价格均衡的时间折扣范围在闭环解决方案下比在开环解决方案下要宽。

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