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首页> 外文期刊>Physica, A. Statistical mechanics and its applications >Evolution of cooperation in well-mixed N-person snowdrift games
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Evolution of cooperation in well-mixed N-person snowdrift games

机译：混合型N人雪堆游戏中合作的演变

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We study the time evolution of cooperation in a recently proposed N-person evolutionary snowdrift game, by focusing on the details of the evolutionary dynamics. It is found that the analytic solution for the equilibrium fraction of cooperators as given previously by the replicator dynamics stems from a balance between the terms: the cost to contribute to a common task and the risk in refusing to participate in a common task. Analytic expressions for these two terms are given, and their magnitudes are studied over the whole range of parameter space. Away from equilibrium, it is the imbalance between these terms that drives the system to equilibrium. A continuous time first-order differential equation for the degree of cooperation is derived, for arbitrary interacting group size N and cost-to-benefit ratio. Analytic solutions to the time evolution of cooperation for the cases of N = 2 and N = 3 are obtained, with results in good agreement with those obtained by numerical simulations. For arbitrary N, numerical solutions to the equation give the time evolution of cooperation, with the long time limit giving the equilibrium fraction of cooperators. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：通过关注进化动力学的细节，我们在最近提出的N人进化雪堆游戏中研究了合作的时间演化。发现复制者动力学先前给出的合作者均衡分数的解析解源于以下各项之间的平衡：共同任务的成本和拒绝参与共同任务的风险。给出了这两个项的解析表达式，并研究了它们在整个参数空间范围内的大小。除了均衡之外，正是这些项之间的不平衡驱使系统达到了均衡。对于任意相互作用的组大小N和成本效益比，推导了一个连续时间一阶微分方程，用于协调度。获得了N = 2和N = 3情况下合作时间演化的解析解，其结果与数值模拟的结果吻合良好。对于任意N，方程的数值解给出了协作的时间演化，而长时限给出了协作者的平衡分数。 （C）2008 Elsevier B.V.保留所有权利。

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