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首页> 美国政府科技报告 >How Do Managers Target Their Credit Ratings. A Study of Credit Ratings and Managerial Discretion: FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper, No. 2008-04
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How Do Managers Target Their Credit Ratings. A Study of Credit Ratings and Managerial Discretion: FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper, No. 2008-04

机译：经理如何定位他们的信用评级。信用评级和管理自由裁量权研究：FDIC金融研究中心工作文件，第2008-04号

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摘要

Managers choose credit rating targets by trading off the benefits associated with a high rating against the higher cost of capital associated with the additional equity required to maintain the high rating. We find that small and risky firms tend to target lower ratings, whereas firms with high growth opportunities tend to target higher ratings. In addition, firms with small boards and large blockholders tend to target lower ratings. We also find that deviations from rating targets influence subsequent capital structure choices. When observed ratings are below (above) the target, managers tend to make security issuance and repurchase decisions that reduce (increase) leverage. In addition, firms are more likely to increase dividend payouts when they have above target ratings and are less likely to make acquisitions when they have below target ratings.

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