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Shareholder Supremacy in a Nexus of Contracts: A Nexus of Problems

机译：一系列合同中的股东至上：一系列问题

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摘要

This article focuses on shareholder supremacy and exclusivity derived from a view of the company as a nexus of contracts. The nexus of contracts theory is the dominant theory within English company law. It defines the company as a contract between private individuals. The shareholders and the company are recognized as the only parties to that contract. While corporate membership is reserved exclusively for shareholders, the rest of the stakeholders are viewed as external to the company. The article will question the theoretical and doctrinal validity of shareholder supremacy and exclusivity within this context. It argues that while the nexus of contracts theory promotes shareholder exclusivity in a rather dogmatic manner, not only the law but also the courts have limited the rights of shareholders to a significant extent. The article does not place into doubt the importance of shareholders within the corporate context; after all the shareholders are the capital providers of the company. It does however criticize the current status quo in English company law where theoretically the shareholders are sitting on the corporate throne in a company which includes no one else but them, but in practice their supremacy is challenged by the courts to such a degree that it is difficult to exercise even the rights stemming from their shares and to have access to effective remedies against managerial abuse. The article will therefore underline the controversies inherent in the nexus of contracts theory. It will shed light on the distorted application of the theory within English company law. It argues that the theory should be reformed to adjust to the new reality. On the one hand, it should certainly protect the rights of shareholders stemming from their shares and it should allow for effective shareholder protection against mismanagement. On the other hand, the theory should adopt a more inclusive definition of the company that will not leave the stakeholders off its context. Especially those stakeholders who clearly have a contractual relationship with the company should be factored into corporate governance. Therefore, the article will argue against the doctrinal dominance of shareholder exclusivity and supremacy by arguing that they nowadays flow from a flawed interpretation of the nexus of contracts theory. The article will focus on shareholder protection; it will examine section 994 of the Companies Act 2006, which provides for one of the main remedies against directorial abuse. The jurisprudence of the courts embodies a clear mismatch between theory and practice. Absolute shareholder supremacy should have entailed an enhanced level of protection to match the status of shareholders as the only members of the company. After all, the nexus of contracts theory defines the interests of the company as the interests of the shareholders. Yet, the judicial stance on this matter proves that the courts have actually curtailed the protection granted to shareholders by the Companies Act 2006; this clearly testifies to the deeply problematic nature of shareholder supremacy within the context of the nexus of contracts theory. The article will therefore argue that the dominant views in theory, academia and law, which continue to recognize a notion of absolute shareholder supremacy and exclusivity, flow mostly from ideology rather than reality. Ideological dogmatism has resulted in a very narrow, and in many ways distorted, definition of the company; one which left only the shareholders within its context albeit and paradoxically with a limited set of rights to control the management. The article argues that the current law should be reformed, aiming at creating a more inclusive company where shareholders would actually enjoy a bundle of rights appropriate for capital providers. The law should also be reformed so that stakeholders whose interests are integrally linked with the company?s fortune ? such as employees and creditors ? should be factored into the company. This is in the interests of both the company and the shareholders.
机译：本文关注的是股东的至高无上性和排他性，这种排他性和排他性是从公司作为合同关系的观点得出的。合同理论的联系是英国公司法中的主导理论。它把公司定义为私人之间的合同。股东和公司被视为该合同的唯一当事人。虽然公司成员资格专门为股东保留，但其他利益相关者被视为公司外部。本文将质疑在这种情况下股东至高无上和排他性的理论和理论有效性。它认为，虽然契约论的联系以相当教条的方式促进了股东的排他性，但不仅法律而且法院都在很大程度上限制了股东的权利。该文章毫不怀疑股东在公司背景下的重要性；毕竟，所有股东都是公司的资本提供者。但是它确实批评了英国公司法的现状，理论上说，股东坐在一家公司中的公司宝座上，除了包括他们之外，没有其他人，但是在实践中，法院对他们的至高无上的地位提出了质疑。甚至连他们所享有的权利也难以行使，也很难获得有效的补救措施以应对管理滥用。因此，本文将强调合同理论内在联系所固有的争议。它将阐明该理论在英国公司法中的扭曲应用。它认为应该对理论进行改革以适应新的现实。一方面，它当然应该保护股东从其股份中获得的权利，并且应该允许有效的股东保护以防管理不善。另一方面，该理论应采用对公司更具包容性的定义，这不会使利益相关者脱离其背景。特别是那些明显与公司有合同关系的利益相关者，应纳入公司治理范围。因此，本文认为，如今的股东排他性和至高无上的理论支配力来自对合同关系的有误解的解释，这将反对这些原则。本文将重点关注股东保护；它将审查《 2006年公司法》第994条，该条规定了针对董事滥用的主要补救措施之一。法院的判例体现了理论与实践之间的明显不匹配。绝对的股东至高无上应该赋予更高的保护水平，以匹配股东作为公司唯一成员的地位。毕竟，契约关系理论将公司的利益定义为股东的利益。然而，有关此事的司法立场证明，法院实际上削减了《 2006年公司法》赋予股东的保护；这清楚地证明了在契约理论联系的背景下，股东至上的深层问题性质。因此，本文将争辩说，理论，学术界和法律上的主流观点继续认识到绝对的股东至高无上和排他性的观念，主要来自意识形态而不是现实。意识形态的专断主义导致公司的定义非常狭窄，并且在许多方面都扭曲了公司的定义。一个人只在其上下文中留给了股东，尽管自相矛盾的是，他们拥有有限的控制管理层的权利。该文章认为，应该对现行法律进行改革，旨在创建一个更具包容性的公司，使股东实际上将享受一整套适合资本提供者的权利。还应该对法律进行改革，以使利益相关的利益相关者与公司的命运紧密相连。如雇员和债权人？应该纳入公司。这符合公司和股东的利益。

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    Koutsias M;

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