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The cyclical behaviour of employers' monopsony power and workers' wages

机译:雇主垄断权力与工人工资的周期性行为

摘要

This paper investigates the behaviour of employers' monopsony power and workers' wages over the business cycle. Using German administrative linked employer--employee data for the years 1985--2010 and an estimation framework based on duration models, we construct a time series of the firm-level labour supply elasticity and estimate its relationship to the aggregate unemployment rate. In line with theory, we find that firms possess more monopsony power during economic downturns, which shows to be robust to controlling for time-invariant unobserved worker heterogeneity. We also document that cyclical changes in workers' entry wages are of similar magnitude as those predicted under monopsonistic wage setting, suggesting that monopsony power should not be neglected when analysing wage cyclicality.
机译:本文研究了在整个商业周期中雇主的垄断权和工人工资的行为。利用1985--2010年德国行政联系的雇主-雇员数据和基于工期模型的估算框架,我们构建了企业层面劳动力供应弹性的时间序列,并估算了其与总失业率的关系。根据理论,我们发现企业在经济衰退期间拥有更多的垄断能力,这显示出控制时变的未观察到的工人异质性的鲁棒性。我们还证明,工人入职工资的周期性变化与单调工资设定下所预测的变化幅度相似,这表明在分析工资周期性时不应忽略单调权力。

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