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Incentive Mechanism for University Teachers under Multi-task Principal-Agent Model

机译：多任务委托-代理模式下的高校教师激励机制

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摘要

Currently universities have faced a popular realistic subject, that is, how to construct a reasonable salary incentive mechanism based on two tasks of teaching and scientific research for teachers. This paper builds a multi-task principal-agent model based on those tasks which are delegated to teachers by universities. Then, through in-depth analysis of the model, we explore the relationships among teachers' effort level, relative incentive intensity, tasks' uncertainty degree, and their risk aversion. The results show that, when teachers' risk aversion and tasks' uncertainty degree become bigger, their effort level will become lower. Secondly, the relative incentive intensity will reduce with the increase of the uncertainty of teaching task and the relative incentive intensity will increase with the increase of the uncertainty of scientific research task. Finally, teachers should be motivated differently according to tasks uncertainty and risk aversion.
机译：当前大学面临着一个普遍的现实问题，即如何基于教师教学和科研两个任务构建合理的薪酬激励机制。本文基于大学委托给教师的任务，建立了多任务委托代理模型。然后，通过对该模型的深入分析，我们探索了教师的努力水平，相对激励强度，任务的不确定程度以及他们的风险规避之间的关系。结果表明，当教师的风险规避程度和任务的不确定性程度变大时，他们的努力程度就会降低。其次，相对激励强度随着教学任务不确定性的增加而降低，相对激励强度随着科研任务不确定性的增加而增加。最后，应根据任务的不确定性和风险规避来不同地激励教师。

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