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FEEDBACK OF CONTRACTS EFFORTS IN THREE TIERS SUPPLY CHAINS

机译:三层供应链的合同绩效反馈

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摘要

We address three tiers supply chains selling short-life cycle products which consisting of a supplier, a manufacturer (or distributor) and a retailer facing uncertain price-dependent demand. At first, the wholesale price from the supplier to the manufacturer is determined. The manufacturer chooses his sales price to the retailer and the retailer need to decide his order quantity and sales prices to the final market. Naturally, the manufacturer can introduce contracts to coordinate the two tiers supply chain contained himself and the retailer to improve their performance. The retailer will order more when the contract goes into effect. Thereafter, the supplier can sale more products (or components) and benefits from the external effort of the contracts in which he does not participate. When the business cycle repeated, the supplier will attempt to change his wholesale price to maximize his own profit, which contrary affects the contracts effort to the downstream firms. Such phenomena are called feedback of contracts efforts in this paper, which is seldom studied in the former contracts literatures as most of them only consider two tiers supply chains. We develop models to analyze such feedback in this paper.
机译:我们处理销售短寿命产品的三级供应链,其中包括面临不确定的价格依赖性需求的供应商,制造商(或分销商)和零售商。首先,确定从供应商到制造商的批发价格。制造商选择其对零售商的销售价格,而零售商需要确定其针对最终市场的订单数量和销售价格。当然,制造商可以引入合同来协调自己和零售商所包含的两级供应链,以改善其绩效。合同生效后,零售商将订购更多。此后,供应商可以销售更多产品(或组件),并从他未参与的合同的外部努力中受益。当商业周期重复时,供应商将尝试改变批发价格以最大化自己的利润,这反过来影响了与下游企业的合同工作。这种现象在本文中被称为合同工作的反馈,在以前的合同文献中很少研究这种现象,因为其中大多数只考虑了两级供应链。我们在本文中开发模型来分析这种反馈。

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