• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文会议>International conference on systems science and systems engineering >FEEDBACK OF CONTRACTS EFFORTS IN THREE TIERS SUPPLY CHAINS
【24h】

FEEDBACK OF CONTRACTS EFFORTS IN THREE TIERS SUPPLY CHAINS

机译：在三层供应链中的合同努力反馈

获取原文
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

We address three tiers supply chains selling short-life cycle products which consisting of a supplier, a manufacturer (or distributor) and a retailer facing uncertain price-dependent demand. At first, the wholesale price from the supplier to the manufacturer is determined. The manufacturer chooses his sales price to the retailer and the retailer need to decide his order quantity and sales prices to the final market. Naturally, the manufacturer can introduce contracts to coordinate the two tiers supply chain contained himself and the retailer to improve their performance. The retailer will order more when the contract goes into effect. Thereafter, the supplier can sale more products (or components) and benefits from the external effort of the contracts in which he does not participate. When the business cycle repeated, the supplier will attempt to change his wholesale price to maximize his own profit, which contrary affects the contracts effort to the downstream firms. Such phenomena are called feedback of contracts efforts in this paper, which is seldom studied in the former contracts literatures as most of them only consider two tiers supply chains. We develop models to analyze such feedback in this paper.
机译：我们介绍三层供应链销售由供应商，制造商（或分销商）和面临不确定价格相关需求的零售商组成的短生活圈产品。首先，确定供应商到制造商的批发价格。制造商将其销售价格选择给零售商，零售商需要将其订单数量和销售价格决定到最终市场。当然，制造商可以引入合同，协调两个层供应链所遏制自己和零售商，以提高其性能。当合同生效时，零售商将更多地订购更多。此后，供应商可以从他没有参加的合同的外部努力销售更多产品（或组件）和福利。当商业周期重复时，供应商将试图改变他的批发价格以最大化自己的利润，这相反影响了向下游公司的合同努力。此类现象称为合同努力的反馈，这篇论文很少在前任合同文献中研究，因为他们中的大多数只考虑两个层供应链。我们开发模型来分析本文的这种反馈。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号