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Game-Theoretic Analysis of Attack and Defense in Cyber-Physical Network Infrastructures

机译：网络物理网络基础设施攻击与防御的游戏 - 理论分析

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摘要

Critical infrastructures rely on cyber and physical components that are both subject to natural, incidental or intentional degradations. Game theory has been used in studying the strategic interactions between attackers and defenders for critical infrastructure protection, but has not been extensively used in complex cyber-physical networks. This paper fills the gap by modeling the probabilities of successful attacks in both cyber and physical spaces as functions of the number of components that are attacked and defended. The results show that the attack effort would first increase then decrease in (a) defense effort, (b) the probability of successful attack on each component, (c) the number of minimum required functioning resources, and (d) the maximum number of available resources. Comparing simultaneous and sequential games, our results show that the defender performs better when she moves first. Our research provides some novel insights into the survival of such infrastructures and optimal resource allocation under various costs and target valuations that players may have.
机译：关键基础设施依赖于网络和物理组件，既受自然，偶然或故意退化。博弈论已被用于研究攻击者和捍卫者之间的战略互动，以实现关键基础设施保护，但尚未广泛用于复杂的网络物理网络。本文通过为攻击和辩护的组件数量的函数来建模成功攻击的概率来填充差距。结果表明，攻击努力首先将增加（a）防御努力下降，（b）成功攻击每个组件的概率，（c）所需的最低功能资源的数量，以及（d）最大数量可用资源。比较同声和顺序游戏，我们的结果表明，当她先移动时，后卫会更好地表现更好。我们的研究提供了一些新颖的见解，进入此类基础设施的生存和在各种成本下的最佳资源分配以及球员可能拥有的目标估值。

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