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Elastic Network Service Provisioning with VNF Auctioning

机译:通过VNF拍卖进行弹性网络服务配置

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Network Function Virtualization (NFV) is an emerging approach that has received attention from both academia and industry as a way to improve flexibility, efficiency, and manageability of networks. NFV enables new ways to operate networks and to provide composite network services, opening the path toward new business models. As in cloud computing with the Infrastructure as a Service model, clients will be offered the ability to provision and instantiate Virtual Network Functions (VNF) on the NFV infrastructure of the network operators. In this paper, we consider the case where leftover VNF capacities are offered for bid. This approach is particularly interesting for clients to promptly provision resources to absorb peak or unpredictable demands and for operators to increase their revenues. We propose a game theoretic approach, using Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions to select the winning clients and the price they pay. Such a formulation allows clients to express their VNF requests according to their specific objectives. We solve this problem with a greedy heuristic and prove that this approximation of economic efficiency is the closest attainable in polynomial time and provides a payment system that motivates bidders to submit their true valuations. Simulation results show that the proposed heuristic achieves a market valuation close to the optimal (less than 10% deviation) and guarantees that an important part of this valuation is paid as revenue to the operator.
机译:网络功能虚拟化(NFV)是一种新兴的方法,已经得到了学术界和业界的关注,这是一种提高网络灵活性,效率和可管理性的方法。 NFV提供了操作网络和提供复合网络服务的新方法,从而开辟了通往新业务模型的道路。就像在具有基础架构即服务模型的云计算中一样,将为客户提供在网络运营商的NFV基础架构上配置和实例化虚拟网络功能(VNF)的能力。在本文中,我们考虑了将剩余的VNF能力提供给投标的情况。这种方法对于客户迅速调配资源以吸收高峰或不可预测的需求,以及使运营商增加收入特别有趣。我们提出一种博弈论方法,即使用多单位组合拍卖来选择获胜的客户及其所支付的价格。这样的表述允许客户根据他们的特定目标表达他们的VNF请求。我们用贪婪的启发式方法解决了这个问题,并证明了这种经济效率的近似值是多项式时间内最接近的,并且提供了一种激励投标人提交其真实估值的付款系统。仿真结果表明,所提出的启发式方法可以使市场估值接近最佳值(偏差小于10%),并保证该估值的重要部分作为收入支付给运营商。

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