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Procurement Contracts Under Asymmetric Yield Information

机译：不对称收益信息下的采购合同

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摘要

Asymmetric information among supply chain is a normal problem in supply chain risk management literatures. But few of them concern asymmetry of supply risk information while actually supplier does tend to hold some private knowledge about supply uncertainty. In this paper, we investigate buyer's procurement contracts design when yield uncertainty is privately known by supplier. With a given contract structure where the payment depends partly on order quantity and partly on yield quantity, we formulate corresponding game models under complete and asymmetric information based on a single-supplier-single-buyer supply chain system and find the supplier has motivation to reporting a lower yield rate under asymmetric environment. When the supplier's yield rate is two-point distributed, we derive the optimal procurement contracts and prove that buyer will provide either Shut-Down Contracts or Pooling Contracts. Moreover, compared with complete information, buyer's profit is always declined by the asymmetry while supplier does not certainly benefit: for a supplier with higher yield rate, private information is always an advantage, but for a supplier with lower yield rate, such asymmetry may hurt her profit on the contrary. It means sharing information sometimes might be a win-win policy for supplier with lower yield rate.
机译：供应链之间的信息不对称是供应链风险管理文献中的常见问题。但是，其中很少有人关注供应风险信息的不对称性，而实际上供应商确实倾向于掌握有关供应不确定性的一些私人知识。在本文中，我们调查当供应商私下知道收益不确定性时的买方采购合同设计。对于给定的合同结构，其中付款部分取决于订单数量，部分取决于产量，我们基于单供应商-单买家供应链系统，在完全和不对称的信息下制定了相应的博弈模型，并发现供应商有举报的动机在非对称环境下较低的良率。当供应商的收益率是两点分布的时，我们得出最优的采购合同，并证明买方将提供关闭合同或合并合同。此外，与完整信息相比，买方的利润总是因不对称而下降，而供应商却不一定能从中获利：对于收益率较高的供应商，私人信息始终是优势，但对于收益率较低的供应商，这种不对称可能会损害相反她的利润。这意味着共享信息有时对于收益率较低的供应商而言可能是双赢的政策。

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