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Research on Strategy of Commercial Bank Risk-taking Behavior and Capital Regulation Based on Signal Game

机译：基于信号游戏的商业银行风险行为与资本监管策略研究

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摘要

This paper analyzes the signal passing effects of the capital regulatory constraints on choose of commercial bank risk-taking behavior by using signal game theory.We get that regulatory authorities should take strict regulation on high-risk banks to restrain their risk-taking incentives and take loose regulation on low-risk banks to encourage their profitability.Then,the supervisory authorities should strengthen the influence on reputation of the regulators and banks,be tougher and increase the penalties for high-risk banks.Moreover,we should increase their efforts,and lower the regulatory cost.
机译：本文分析了利用信号博弈论对商业银行风险行为选择资本监管限制的信号传递影响。我们认为监管机构应对高风险银行严格监管，以抑制其风险的激励措施并采取低风险银行的规定，鼓励他们的盈利。该监管机构应加强对监管机构和银行声誉的影响，更加艰难，增加对高风险银行的处罚​​。我们应该增加他们的努力，以及降低监管费用。

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