SaaS (Saas-a-service) service model develops rapidly in the production service industry. In the process of development, market demand is uncertain. There is a risk of loss of profits among members of SaaS service supply chain. From the perspective of risk preference, this paper discusses contract coordination in SaaS service supply chain. We consider a two-stage SaaS service supply chain composed of SaaS service platform and independent software provider ISV. We discuss the decentralized decision-making of supply chain members under different risk aversion situations, and propose compensation contracts and risk sharing-penalty contracts based on service quality test results. The results show that under in the risk aversion environment, the risk-sharing penalty contract can promote the simultaneous coordination of effort level and capacity supply, and maximize the overall benefit of the supply chain; the cost-sharing compensation contract cannot promote the coordination of effort level and capacity supply. It can effectively realize the growth of supply chain revenue and enhance the stability of supply chain operation, but it does not maximize the supply chain revenue. The increase of risk aversion level will lead to the reduction of the feasible domain of contract coordination, weaken the coordination ability of the two contracts, and increase the coordination difficulty of the supply chain.
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