• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文会议>ICEEP 2012 >The Game Analysis on Moral Hazard in the Safety Supervision of Nuclear Power
【24h】

The Game Analysis on Moral Hazard in the Safety Supervision of Nuclear Power

机译：核电安全监督道德危害的博弈分析

获取原文
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

The development of nuclear power has become an important way to solve the problems of environment and energy in many countries, also it is an important policy to solve the problems of e energy structure in China. But moral hazard in the safety supervision of nuclear power has happened. By adopting the game analysis method and establishing the game model of moral hazard in the safety supervision of nuclear power, the paper analysis the model with static mixed game and finite iterations of dynamic game. As a result, it can lower the moral hazard if the governments strengthen the punishment in violation of safety rules and reduce the supervision cost.
机译：核电的发展已成为解决许多国家环境和能源问题的重要途径，也是解决中国电子能源结构问题的重要政策。但核电安全监管的道德危害发生了。通过采用游戏分析方法并在核电安全监督安全监督中建立道德风险的游戏模型，纸张分析静态混合游戏模型及动态游戏有限迭代。因此，如果政府加强违反安全规则的惩罚并降低监督成本，则可以降低道德风险。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号