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THE ENTRANT'S PRICING DILEMMA: LINKING LOW PRICE ENTRY STRATEGIES TO AGGRESSIVE PRICE RESPONSES BY INCUMBENTS

机译:参赛者的定价困境:将低价格入口策略与现役的侵略性价格响应联系起来

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摘要

We investigate the entrant's dilemma created by penetration pricing. Penetration pricing is a common strategy where firms enter into a market with relatively low prices. Setting a low price offers several advantages for entrants. For example, beating competitor's prices reduces consumers' risk of trial and gives consumers a monetary incentive to switch brands (Blattberg andNeslin 1990). Low prices thus help entrants to gain a foothold in the market and to build scale, especially when demand is price elastic (Moore 1992). However, there are also drawbacks of low price market entry. Low prices send an obvious signal of aggressiveness and can pose a substantial threat to incumbent firms (e.g., Ailawadi, Lehmann, and Neslin 2001). Consequently, low entry prices likely trigger hostile pricing responses by incumbents (Leeflang and Wittink 1992).
机译:我们调查通过渗透定价创造的参赛者的困境。普及定价是一个共同的战略,公司公司以相对较低的价格进入市场。设定低价为参赛者提供了几个优势。例如,竞争竞争对手的价格降低了消费者的审判风险,并为消费者提供了对交换品牌的货币激励(Blatterberg Andenesl 1990)。因此,低价格有助于进入者在市场上立足并建立规模,特别是当需求是价格弹性时(Moore 1992)。但是,还有低价格市场进入的缺点。低价格发出明显的侵略性信号,可以对现有公司构成大量威胁(例如,Ailawadi,Lehmann和Neslin 2001)。因此,低置价格可能会触发现任者的敌意定价响应(Leeflang和Wittink 1992)。

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