• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文会议>SAIF-CAFR Third Shanghai Winter Finance conference. >CEO Overcon.dence or Stock Mispricing and Growth? Reexamining the Effect of CEO Option Exercise Behavior on Corporate Investment
【24h】

CEO Overcon.dence or Stock Mispricing and Growth? Reexamining the Effect of CEO Option Exercise Behavior on Corporate Investment

机译：CEO过度自信还是股票定价错误和增长？重新审视首席执行官期权行使行为对公司投资的影响

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Malmendier and Tate (2005) use CEO late option exercise to proxy for unobservable CEO overcon.dence and argue that managerial overcon.dence can account for investment dis-tortions. Consistent with CEO rationality, this paper provides an alternative explanation to their.ndings. By breaking the market-to-book ratio into.rm mispricing, industry mis-pricing, and growth opportunity, We.nd that industry mispricing and growth opportunities in.uence both CEO option exercise and corporate investment. When.rms are overvalued or have better growth opportunities, CEOs are more likely to postpone their option exercise and at the same time invest more using internal cash. Moreover, CEO late option exercise fails to explain investment decisions after controlling for mispricing and growth opportunities. These.ndings suggest that a CEO.s personal portfolio decision may not be an appropriate proxy for managerial overcon.dence.
机译：Malmendier和Tate（2005）使用CEO的后期期权实践来替代无法观察到的CEO过度自信，并认为管理层过度操守可以解释投资失真。与首席执行官的理性相一致，本文为他们的发现提供了另一种解释。通过将市账率分解为rm定价错误，行业定价错误和增长机会，我们发现行业定价错误和增长机会影响了CEO期权的行使和公司投资。当.rms被高估或拥有更好的增长机会时，CEO更有可能推迟其期权行使，同时使用内部现金进行更多投资。此外，CEO的后期期权行权在控制了定价错误和增长机会之后，无法解释投资决策。这些结果表明，CEO的个人投资组合决策可能不是管理过度自信的适当代理。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号