运用美国上市银行1998—2014年的数据,将股票期权激励、代理成本、CEO过度自信与并购决策纳入统一的框架进行研究,以代理成本为中介变量,CEO过度自信为调节变量,以检验股票期权激励是否会影响并购决策,以及股票期权激励、代理成本、CEO过度自信与并购决策之间的关系。实证结果表明：CEO股票期权激励能够有效刺激其做出并购决策；代理成本对股票期权激励与并购决策的关系存在部分中介效应；CEO过度自信能显著调节股票期权激励与并购决策的关系；CEO过度自信对于股票期权激励与并购决策的关系的调节作用会通过代理成本起作用。%By using the data of public-listed bank bidders in the U. S. from 1998 to 2014, this paper examines the relationship between stock-options incentives, agency cost, CEO overconfidence, and acquisition investment decisions, with agency cost and CEO overconfidence as the mediating and moderating variables respectively. We find that the correlation between CEO stock-option based compensation and acquisition investment decisions is significantly positive; agency cost has a mediating effect between the relationship of stock-options incentives and acquisition investment decisions; the moderating effect of CEO overconfidence is significant;while stock-options incentives cannot induce overconfident CEOs to make acquisitions, non-over-confident CEOs with stock-options incentives are more likely to conduct acquisition investments. The moderating effect of CEO overconfidence can also function via agency cost.
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