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The economic, financial accounting and governance determinants of synthetic lease financing.

机译：合成租赁融资的经济，财务会计和治理决定因素。

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摘要

The synthetic lease is a hybrid financing structure that allows a company to have many of the benefits of asset ownership, including capital lease treatment for tax purposes, while treating lease payments as operating expenses on the firm's income statement. Proponents of these transactions argue that the complexity of these structures is necessary to provide economic benefits to the firm and its shareholders. Critics argue that these transactions are severely lacking in transparency, and the benefits that derive from these transactions are the result of short-sighted opportunistic behavior by managers that lead to wealth extraction from ether groups of stakeholders. I jointly examine (1) whether the structure of the synthetic base does, as supporters argue, provide favorable financing terms for firms that choose this type of transaction, (2) the economic and financial accounting incentives that influence the manager's financing choice and (3) the role of the board of directors is the decision making process. I find evidence that supports both economic benefits associated with the lease, as well as managers using synthetic lease financing for opportunistic gains. The results also show that, all else equal, the probability of choosing synthetic lease financing is increasing in the strength of a firm's board of directors, consistent with strong boards being able to understand the complexity of the transaction and the associated benefits. However, I also find that if managers have incentives to use the synthetic lease to engage in opportunistic behavior, the presence of strong monitors prevents managers' use of synthetic leases for this purpose.
机译：合成租赁是一种混合融资结构，它使公司可以享有资产所有权的许多好处，包括出于税收目的的资本租赁处理，同时将租赁付款视为公司损益表中的营业费用。这些交易的支持者认为，这些结构的复杂性对于向公司及其股东提供经济利益是必要的。批评者认为，这些交易严重缺乏透明度，而从这些交易中获得的收益是管理者的短视机会主义行为的结果，这些行为导致从利益相关者群体中提取财富。我将共同研究（1）支持者认为，综合基地的结构是否确实为选择此类交易的公司提供了有利的融资条件；（2）影响经理人融资选择的经济和财务会计激励机制；（3） ）董事会的角色是决策过程。我发现证据既支持与租赁相关的经济利益，也支持使用合成租赁融资获得机会性收益的管理者。结果还表明，在其他所有条件相同的情况下，选择综合性租赁融资的可能性随着公司董事会实力的提高而增加，这与强大的董事会能够理解交易的复杂性和相关收益相一致。但是，我还发现，如果经理人有动机使用合成租赁进行投机行为，那么强有力的监督者的存在会阻止经理为此目的而使用合成租赁。

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  • 作者

    Altamuro, Jennifer L. M.;

  • 作者单位

    The Pennsylvania State University.;

  • 授予单位 The Pennsylvania State University.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Accounting.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 51 p.
  • 总页数 51
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财务管理、经济核算;
  • 关键词

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