• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文学位 >Externalism and the causal efficacy of content.
【24h】

Externalism and the causal efficacy of content.

机译：外在主义和因果效力的内容。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This dissertation examines a prima facie conflict between two claims: first, that ordinary (or "folk") psychological states play causal roles in psychology in virtue of their contents; and second, that their contents are extrinsic properties. This conflict, sometimes called the problem of externalism, is one of the difficulties facing any complete account of mental causation. I argue that there is no a priori reason why "wide" contents (as they are often called) do not or cannot play causal roles in psychological explanations of behavior, and show how they might do so.; In typical psychological explanations, beliefs, desires and other mental states are cited as causes of behavior: Socrates remained in an Athenian jail because he believed that it was unjust to disobey the city's laws and he desired to act justly. If externalism is true, these contents---e.g. that it is unjust to disobey the city's laws---are individuated partly in terms of the nature of the agent's physical or social environment. It follows that if the environment is relevantly different, contents differ---even if there is no physical difference in the agent.; A variety of arguments try to show that externalism is not compatible with the causal role of content. I show how each argument fails to support its conclusion. I take one of Jerry Fodor's arguments as the most difficult. Fodor argues that wide contents violate the principle that mental properties must supervene on, or be identical to, neural properties if mental causation is to be made "intelligible". I show that his argument rests on the assumption that these neural properties are intrinsic, and argue that this "intrinsic hypothesis" is unjustified based on evidence from quantum chemistry and neuroscience. I also argue that at least some of the neural properties that play causal roles in computational theories of mind may be extrinsic. If so, then "wide" contents can be identified with or supervene on these properties, and they would satisfy Fodor's principle. I conclude by showing how this solution to the problem of externalism meshes with a general account of mental causation recently defended by Derk Pereboom.
机译：本文研究了两种主张之间的表面上的矛盾：首先，普通（或“民间”）心理状态凭借其内容在心理学中起因果作用；第二，它们的内容是外部性质。这种冲突有时被称为外在主义问题，是任何对精神因果关系的全面阐述所面临的困难之一。我认为没有先验的理由可以解释为什么“广泛的”内容（通常被称为）在行为的心理学解释中没有或不能起因果作用，并说明了它们如何这样做。在典型的心理解释中，信仰，欲望和其他精神状态被称为行为的原因：苏格拉底之所以被囚禁在雅典的监狱中，是因为他认为违反城市法律是不公正的，他希望公正行事。如果外在主义是真的，那么这些内容-违反城市法律是不公正的，部分原因是代理人的身体或社会环境的性质。随之而来的是，如果环境有本质上的不同，那么内容也会有所不同-即使代理之间没有物理上的差异。各种各样的论据试图表明，外部主义与内容的因果作用不兼容。我展示了每个论点如何都不支持其结论。我认为杰里·福多（Jerry Fodor）的论点之一是最困难的。福多认为，广泛的内容违反了使精神因果关系“难以理解”的精神属性必须超越或等同于神经属性的原理。我表明他的论据基于这些神经属性是内在的假设，并基于量子化学和神经科学的证据辩称，这种“内在假设”是不合理的。我还认为，至少在神经计算理论中起因果作用的某些神经属性可能是外在的。如果是这样，则“宽”的内容可以被识别或取代于这些属性，并且它们将满足Fodor原理。在结束时，我将展示这种对外部主义问题的解决方案与最近由Derk Pereboom辩护的精神因果关系的一般描述相吻合。

著录项

  • 作者

    Figdor, Carrie.;

  • 作者单位

    City University of New York.;

  • 授予单位 City University of New York.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 267 p.
  • 总页数 267
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 哲学理论;
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号