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Individual managers, financial reporting and the managerial labor market.

机译：个人经理，财务报告和管理劳动力市场。

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This thesis comprises of three chapters. The first essay is titled `Managers: Their Effects on Accruals and Firm Policies' and is joint work with Douglas V. DeJong. The second essay is titled `Can the Capital Market Recognize a Manager's Financial Reporting Style?' and is sole-authored. The third essay is titled `Executive Compensation in a Matching Model' and is joint work with Douglas V. DeJong, Elena Pastorino and B. Ravikumar.;Chapter one investigates whether top executives have significant individual-specific effects on accruals that cannot be explained by firm characteristics. Exploiting 37 years of individual executives and firm data, we find that individual executives play a significant role in determining firms' accruals. In addition, we examine whether executives' effects on accruals are related to their personal styles in investment, financing and operating decisions. Our results show that individual executives' effects on accruals are more correlated to their operating decisions than investment and financing decisions. We also compare effects exerted by CEOs to CFOs. We find CEOs are more likely to affect accruals through firm policy decisions and CFOs are more likely to affect accruals through accounting decisions. CFOs tend to report more "solid" earnings than CEOs, i.e., CFOs are more likely to push accruals to zero.;Chapter two examines whether investors can recognize idiosyncratic differences in managers' financial reporting behavior. Specifically, I investigate whether the capital market can recognize a manager's financial reporting aggressiveness and whether investors' recognition of a manager's style follows a Bayesian learning process. I use a manager's specific effect on discretionary accruals to measure her financial reporting aggressiveness. My results show that investors find earnings forecasts issued by aggressive managers to be less credible and thus respond less strongly. I also find investors follow a Bayesian learning process to identify a manager's individual style. As a manager's financial reporting history becomes longer, there is less uncertainty about the manager's true style. Consequently, the discount on the market reaction to earnings forecast news due to the manager's aggressiveness becomes larger. In sum, these results suggest that a manager's prior financial reporting history allows her to develop a financial reporting reputation, which can be inferred by investors through rationally processing historical information.;Chapter three outlines our future research plan to revisit the relative importance of returns to firm-specific tenure and to general labor market experience in the labor market for executives. We shed light on the importance of explicitly accounting for an executive's firm-to-firm and job-to-job mobility, within and across firms, over the course of the executive's career in order to measure the magnitude of each type of returns.
机译：本文共分三章。第一篇文章的标题是“经理：他们对应计和公司政策的影响”，与道格拉斯·德容（Douglas V. DeJong）共同研究。第二篇文章的标题是“资本市场可以识别经理的财务报告风格吗？”并且是唯一作者。第三篇论文的标题是“匹配模​​型中的执行薪酬”，是与道格拉斯·V·德容，埃琳娜·帕斯托里诺和B·拉维库玛的合著；第一章调查了高管人员是否对应计项目产生重大的个人特定影响，而这一点无法用解释来解释。坚定的特点。利用37年的个人高管人员和公司数据，我们发现个人高管人员在确定公司应计费用中发挥着重要作用。此外，我们研究了高管对应计制的影响是否与他们在投资，融资和经营决策中的个人风格有关。我们的结果表明，与投资和融资决策相比，个人高管对应计制的影响与他们的经营决策更相关。我们还比较了CEO对CFO的影响。我们发现，首席执行官更有可能通过公司的政策决定影响应计费用，而首席财务官则更有可能通过会计决策来影响应计费用。与首席执行长相比，首席财务官倾向于报告更多的“稳定”收益，即首席财务官更有可能将应计利润推为零。第二章探讨了投资者是否能够认识到经理财务报告行为的特殊差异。具体来说，我研究了资本市场是否可以识别经理人的财务报告侵略性以及投资者对经理人风格的认可是否遵循贝叶斯学习过程。我使用经理对全权应计制的特定影响来衡量其财务报告的积极性。我的结果表明，投资者发现积极进取的经理人发布的收益预测的可信度较低，因此反应较弱。我还发现投资者遵循贝叶斯学习过程来确定经理的个人风格。随着经理的财务报告历史变得越来越长，关于经理的真实风格的不确定性也就越来越小。因此，由于经理人的进取心，市场对盈余预测新闻的反应折扣越来越大。总之，这些结果表明，经理的先前财务报告历史可以使她建立财务报告声誉，这可以由投资者通过合理地处理历史信息来推论。第三章概述了我们未来的研究计划，以重新考察收益对公司的相对重要性。公司特定的任期和对高管人员在一般劳动力市场的经验。我们阐明了在高管人员职业生涯中，明确说明高管人员在公司内部和公司之间以及公司与公司之间以及公司之间的流动性的重要性，以衡量每种类型的回报的幅度。

著录项

  • 作者

    Ling, Zhejia.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Iowa.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Iowa.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Accounting.;Business Administration Management.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2012
  • 页码 133 p.
  • 总页数 133
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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