• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文学位 >Politics for protection: Japanese interwar economic policy towards the petroleum and automobile industries.
【24h】

Politics for protection: Japanese interwar economic policy towards the petroleum and automobile industries.

机译：保护政策：日本针对石油和汽车工业的两次世界大战之间的经济政策。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

In portraying Japanese political economy, existing accounts (i.e., Japan, Inc., Statism, pluralism) assume the state-firm relationship as a fixed set of relations and structures and thus ignore or fail to specify the contingent aspect of the state-firm relationship which is characterized by power sharing among intrastate agencies (ministries) and private firms. By focusing on the interaction of economic ideas and organizational interests in cases of petroleum and automobile industries in interwar Japan, this dissertation sorts out two rival ideas of politico-economic discourse on the nature of industry and trade and their developmental strategy, "trade-oriented mercantilism" and "autarky-oriented mercantilism," and then explores (1) how these ideas were linked with organizational interests of intrastate agencies, (2) how they were interwoven in different temporal and spatial settings, and (3) what were the mechanisms by which resulted intrastate coalitions interacted with economic interests of firms.;This analysis shows that the state and firms shared power in the way in which the state defined the agenda while allowing firms to decide and implement certain issues shaped by the agenda. The Japanese state had the "confining power" (the ability to confine the scope of decision making to certain issues) which resulted from its consistent attempts to remove politically sensitive issues out of the political arena and into the administrative arena. The state successfully prevented open political contestation or public airing of political conflict over these issues by eliminating from agenda setting the intervention of political parties, the Diet, and the Cabinet, and forcing private firms to deal directly with the state over processual and administrative issues. As a result, firms competed for a "share of power," and not for "control of power.".
机译：在描述日本的政治经济时，现有帐户（即Japan，Inc.，Statism，多元主义）将国家-公司关系假定为一组固定的关系和结构，因此忽略或未能指定国家-公司关系的或有方面。其特点是州内机构（部委）和私人公司之间的权力共享。着眼于战后日本石油和汽车工业中经济思想与组织利益的相互作用，本文从工业贸易性质及其发展战略出发，梳理了政治经济论述中的两个对立思想：“以贸易为导向”。重商主义”和“以关税为中心的重商主义”，然后探讨（1）这些想法如何与州内机构的组织利益联系在一起；（2）它们如何在不同的时空环境中交织在一起；（3）机制是什么分析表明，国家和企业通过国家定义议程的方式共享权力，同时允许企业决定和实施由议程决定的某些问题。日本国家具有“约束力”（将决策范围限制在某些问题上的能力），这是日本一贯试图将政治上敏感的问题从政治领域转移到行政领域的结果。国家通过在议程中取消设置政党，国会和内阁的干预措施，并迫使私营公司直接在程序和行政问题上与国家打交道，从而成功地防止了在这些问题上的公开政治竞争或政治冲突。结果，公司竞争“权力共享”，而不是“权力控制”。

著录项

  • 作者

    Sohn, Yul.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Chicago.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Chicago.;
  • 学科 Political science.;Economic history.;Asian history.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 1994
  • 页码 249 p.
  • 总页数 249
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 宗教;
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号