Using extensive field research (conducting interviews and searching periodicals and newspapers), my dissertation analyzes the political process of Japanese tax reform in the 1980s: the introduction of a new tax broadly based on consumption. In 1979 and again in 1987, Ministry of Finance proposals for a major indirect tax on consumption were defeated. Yet, in 1988, with no change in the underlying political institutions or party alliances, the tax was passed, and went into effect in the spring of 1989. I suggest that the final introduction of the new tax on consumption was a result of political maneuvering by the bureaucrats who rationally pursued their organizational interests.;My study addresses three different, but interrelated inquiries. The first is purely empirical: why and how did the Japanese government finally introduce the new tax? This study provides a comparative analysis of the Japanese political system which facilitates bureaucratic influence in policymaking. It shows how the bureaucrats persuaded incumbent politicians of the value of the consumption tax, shaped political agendas, and cultivated the opposition. Then, utilizing the Japanese tax reform case, I examine the extent and manner in which the power interest of technocratic bureaucrats affect policy outcomes. The highly technical characteristics of tax issues make this reform an interesting case to explore the possibility of the influence of technocratic bureaucrats. The argument utilizes the concepts of political strategy used by fiscal bureaucrats to explain the eventual introduction of the apparently unpopular new tax. However, this study is not interested in generalizing the role of bureaucrats in policymaking as has been true of many works in comparative politics. The ultimate aim of my study is to explore the influence of technocratic expertise and the power of rational thinking in politics.
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