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The Regulatory Framework for Takeovers in the United Kingdom and Nigeria: Shareholders and Employees Protection in Perspective

机译：英国和尼日利亚的收购监管框架：股东和员工保护的视角

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摘要

This thesis critically examines the extent to which the interests of company shareholders and employees can be protected during takeovers in Nigeria. High costs of takeovers lead to losses or insignificant gains to shareholders of acquiring companies. To mitigate the effects of the costs on shareholder wealth, employees are often disengaged. This raises concerns about the effectiveness of takeover administration in Nigeria, especially in light of the high rate of unemployment. Consequently, an assessment of the role of company managements and the effectiveness of the current institutional framework for takeover administration in Nigeria is justified.;The thesis adopts a comparative approach to ascertain how similar takeover challenges in Nigeria are addressed in the United Kingdom. Takeovers in both jurisdictions are regulated by the combined effects of Statutory Rules and Administrative Rules and similar challenges can be experienced in both jurisdictions. Further to this, two issues were identified. First, to what extent are shareholders and employees currently protected during takeovers in Nigeria? This issue identifies the scope of the problems. Secondly, are there any peculiar or similar effects of regulatory control over takeovers in Nigeria and the United Kingdom? This determines the comparative function of the thesis, in relation to the scope of the problem that is identified by the first issue.;The relevance of the new institutional economics in the development of institutions was identified and illustrated using two main institutional aspects. First, the role of the informal institutions (unique societal factors) in influencing institutional developments is identified. Secondly, the thesis illustrates how the main themes of economics of institutions, namely, property rights, transaction costs economics and agency relationships can address the identified challenges. Company shares can be effectively protected as property rights of shareholders and the role of managements can be restricted to shareholder agents. Also, the thesis shows that uncertainties and incompleteness of employment contracts can indirectly lead to high costs of takeovers. This can undermine the interests of both shareholders and employees. Thus, the thesis proposes a complementary protection to shareholders and employees. It specifically recommends legal reforms to strengthen market efficiency. Further, it challenges the role of managements by constructing an administrative structure that includes employee representatives in the administration of takeovers through smart regulation and social dialogue.
机译：本文主要考察了在尼日利亚进行收购时公司股东和员工的利益受到保护的程度。较高的收购成本会给收购公司的股东带来损失或微不足道的收益。为了减轻成本对股东财富的影响，员工经常被解雇。这引起人们对尼日利亚接管管理有效性的担忧，尤其是鉴于高失业率。因此，有必要对公司管理层的角色以及尼日利亚现行的收购管理体制框架的有效性进行评估。；本文采用比较方法来确定联合王国在尼日利亚如何应对类似的收购挑战。两个司法管辖区的接管均受《成文法则》和《行政规则》的共同影响，在两个司法管辖区都可能遇到类似的挑战。除此之外，还确定了两个问题。首先，在尼日利亚进行收购期间，股东和雇员目前受到何种程度的保护？此问题确定了问题的范围。其次，在尼日利亚和英国，对收购的监管控制是否有特殊或类似的效果？这决定了论文的比较功能，与第一个问题所确定的问题的范围有关。通过两个主要制度方面，确定并说明了新制度经济学在制度发展中的相关性。首先，确定了非正式机构（独特的社会因素）在影响机构发展中的作用。其次，论文阐述了制度经济学的主要主题，即产权，交易成本经济学和代理关系如何解决所面临的挑战。公司股份可以作为股东的财产权得到有效保护，而管理人员的角色可以仅限于股东代理人。此外，论文还表明，雇佣合同的不确定性和不完整会间接导致收购成本高昂。这会损害股东和员工的利益。因此，本文提出了对股东和员工的补充保护。它特别建议进行法律改革以增强市场效率。此外，它通过建立一个包括员工代表在内的行政结构，通过明智的监管和社会对话来管理管理层，从而挑战了管理层的角色。

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  • 作者

    Okanigbuan Jur, Francis Aigboviose.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Manchester (United Kingdom).;

  • 授予单位 The University of Manchester (United Kingdom).;
  • 学科 Law.;Public policy.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2016
  • 页码 348 p.
  • 总页数 348
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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