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Essays on corporate bank loan contracting.

机译：公司银行贷款承包散文。

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摘要

This dissertation is comprised of two essays on corporate bank loan contracting. The purpose of the first essay is to investigate the effect of loan's designated purpose on loan agreement contracting terms, as well as to examine whether lenders apply different standards to assess the value of borrower's corporate governance for each type of loan purpose. Using a large sample of private bank loans, the results indicate that both price and non-price loan terms vary significantly by loan purpose. Specifically, the spread yield varies by about 182 basis points (bps) for loans made for different purposes. Further, borrowers of operations loans (commercial paper backup, general corporate purpose, and working capital) are able to reduce their commitment fees by as much as 30%. In addition, restructure loans (acquisition line, debt repayment, leveraged buyout, spinoff, and takeover) are more sensitive to covenant inclusion than operations loans by as much as 39%. Inclusion of sweep restriction covenants significantly reduces spread yield for restructure loans, while financial ratio restrictions reduce spread yield for operations loans. Finally, empirical findings suggest that corporate governance for operations loans is significantly more influential at affecting both price and non-price terms of loan contracts than for restructure loans.;The second essay utilizes a hostile takeover framework to examine the effect of board busyness on corporate cost of debt. First, the study establishes an inverse relationship between board busyness and firm's hostile takeover vulnerability by implementing the takeover vulnerability index, which allows for study of the relationship ex ante. Second, the relationship between board busyness and cost of debt is investigated. The results indicate that as the level of board busyness increases, the cost of debt decreases. Economically, the findings suggest that for firms whose board is comprised of 40% busy directors, the spread yield is about 27 bps lower than for firms without busy directors.
机译：本文由两篇关于公司银行贷款合同的论文组成。第一篇文章的目的是调查贷款的指定目的对贷款协议合同条款的影响，并检查贷方是否针对每种类型的贷款目的采用不同的标准来评估借款人公司治理的价值。使用大量的私人银行贷款样本，结果表明，价格和非价格贷款条款都因贷款目的而有很大差异。具体来说，针对不同目的的贷款，利差收益率变化约182个基点（bps）。此外，运营贷款（商业票据备份，一般公司用途和营运资金）的借款人可以将承诺费降低多达30％。此外，重组贷款（购置额度，债务偿还，杠杆收购，分拆和收购）对契约包容性的敏感性比运营贷款高39％。包含清算限制契约会大大降低重组贷款的利差收益，而财务比率限制会降低运营贷款的利差收益。最后，实证研究结果表明，与重组贷款相比，运营贷款的公司治理在影响贷款合同的价格和非价格条款方面都具有更大的影响力;第二篇论文利用恶意收购框架来研究董事会繁忙度对公司的影响债务的成本。首先，该研究通过实施收购脆弱性指数建立了董事会繁忙度与公司的敌对收购脆弱性之间的反比关系，从而可以事前研究这种关系。其次，研究了董事会繁忙度与债务成本之间的关系。结果表明，随着董事会繁忙程度的提高，债务成本降低。从经济上讲，研究结果表明，对于董事会由40％忙碌董事组成的公司而言，利差收益率比没有忙碌董事的公司低27个基点。

著录项

  • 作者

    Pashnyak, Leann G.;

  • 作者单位

    Purdue University.;

  • 授予单位 Purdue University.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Accounting.;Economics Finance.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2014
  • 页码 117 p.
  • 总页数 117
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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