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Essays on privacy, information, and anonymous transactions.

机译：关于隐私，信息和匿名交易的文章。

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摘要

This dissertation uses game theoretic models to examine the effects of agent anonymity on markets for goods and for information. In open, anonymous settings, such as the Internet, anonymity is relatively easy to obtain -- oftentimes another email address is sufficient. By becoming anonymous, agents can participate in various mechanisms (such as elections, opinion polls, auctions, etc.) multiple times. The first chapter (joint work with Vincent Conitzer) studies elections that disincentivize voters from voting multiple times. A voting rule is false-name-proof if no agent ever benefits from casting additional votes. In elections with two alternatives, it is shown that there is a unique false-name-proof voting rule that is most responsive to votes. The probability that this rule selects the majority winner converges to 1 as the population grows large. Methods to design analogous rules for elections with 3 or more alternatives are proposed. The second chapter (also joint work with Vincent Conitzer) extends the analysis in the first chapter to broader mechanism design settings, where the goal is to disincentivize agents from participating multiple times. The cost model from the first chapter is generalized and revelation principles are proven. The third chapter studies a setting where firms are able to recognize their previous customers, and may use information about consumers' purchase histories to price discriminate (which may incentivize consumers to be anonymous). The formal model considers a monopolist and a continuum of heterogeneous consumers, where consumers are able to maintain their anonymity at some cost. It is shown that when consumers can costlessly maintain their anonymity, they all individually choose to do so, which paradoxically results in the highest profit for the monopolist. Increasing the cost of anonymity can benefit consumers, but only up to a point; at that point, the effect is reversed. Some of the results are extended to a setting with two competing firms selling differentiated products. Finally, the cost of maintaining anonymity is endogenized by considering a third party that can make consumers anonymous for a fee of its choosing. It is shown that this third party would prefer to be paid by the firm for allowing consumers to costlessly maintain their anonymity.
机译：本文运用博弈论模型研究了代理人匿名对商品和信息市场的影响。在开放的匿名设置（例如Internet）中，相对容易获得匿名-通常，另一个电子邮件地址就足够了。通过匿名，代理可以多次参与各种机制（例如选举，民意调查，拍卖等）。第一章（与文森特·康尼泽（Vincent Conitzer）共同努力）研究了选举，这种选举使选民无法多次投票。如果没有代理人能够从投票中受益，那么投票规则就是防虚假名称的。在具有两种选择的选举中，显示出有一个唯一的防虚假名称投票规则，该规则最能响应选票。随着人口的增长，该规则选择多数胜出者的概率收敛至1。提出了设计具有3个或更多备选方案的类似选举规则的方法。第二章（也是与Vincent Conitzer的共同合作）将第一章中的分析扩展到更广泛的机制设计设置，其目的是抑制代理商多次参与的激励。第一章介绍了成本模型，并阐明了启示原则。第三章研究了企业能够识别其先前客户的环境，并可以使用有关消费者购买历史的信息来区分价格（这可能会激励消费者匿名）。正式模型考虑了异质消费者的垄断者和连续体，消费者能够以某种代价维持其匿名性。结果表明，当消费者可以无成本地维持匿名时，他们都会各自选择这样做，这反而导致垄断者获得了最高的利润。增加匿名的成本可以使消费者受益，但只能在一定程度上受益。在这一点上，效果是相反的。一些结果扩展到两家竞争性公司销售差异化产品的环境。最后，维护匿名性的成本是通过考虑可以以选择费用让消费者匿名的第三方来实现的。结果表明，该第三方希望由公司支付费用，以允许消费者以无成本的方式维持其匿名性。

著录项

  • 作者

    Wagman, Liad.;

  • 作者单位

    Duke University.;

  • 授予单位 Duke University.;
  • 学科 Economics Commerce-Business.;Economics Theory.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2009
  • 页码 151 p.
  • 总页数 151
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 贸易经济;经济学;
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:38:31

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