首页> 中文期刊> 《郑州航空工业管理学院学报》 >财务外包与议价博弈:模型构造与理论解释

财务外包与议价博弈:模型构造与理论解释

         

摘要

Financial Outsourcing is the game behavior between the contracting company and service provider and its successful implementation of the contract is beneficial to both parties.This article establishes a bargaining model related to financial outsourcing from the perspective of the contracting company to find the optimal outsourcing ratio.We find that the higher of the expected cost of financial process,risk and risk aversion,the higher the degree of outsourcing,transaction cost is negative to the degree;from the supplier perspective,the expected cost,risk and risk aversion is negative to the outsourcing,in contrast to the traditonal opinion,the bargaining power has nothing to do with the optimal ratio of outsourcing.%财务外包是发包企业与供应商之间的博弈行为,其合同成功履行对交易双方均有利。文章构建了财务外包与议价博弈模型,从发包企业视角确定了合理的协议区间,在该区间下可找出最优财务流程外包程度。可以看出,发包企业内部处理财务流程的预期成本越高,风险越大以及风险厌恶程度越高,则外包程度越高,而服务供应商的交易成本与外包程度成反比;从供应商角度看,外包程度与服务供应商代理客户处理财务流程的预期成本,风险和风险厌恶程度成反比;与传统认知相悖,固定价格条件下博弈方的议价能力却与最优的外包程度无关。

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