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基于鹰鸽模型的地方政府农民工创业政策研究

         

摘要

National and local governments are paying more and more attention to problems of peasant workers, and have introduced policies to encourage peasant-worker entrepreneurship, hoping that peasant workers can improve living standards, improve the economic growth and employment through entrepreneurship. Especially local governments have introduced tax, land, finance and other policies to encourage peasant workers in the entrepreneurial process, so that there is a game for the local government in the process. This paper uses the hawk-dove game model to analyze the game of local government. It is considered that the local government policy is influenced by the characteristics of peasant workers, and the suggestions are given for local governments in the process of in policy making.%由于国家和地方政府对农民工问题越来越重视,纷纷出台鼓励农民工创业的政策,希望农民工通过创业,改善生活水平,提高经济增长,解决就业。尤其是地方政府在鼓励农民工创业过程中出台了税收、土地、金融等方面的政策,这样地方政府在这个过程中就存在着博弈现象。利用鹰鸽博弈模型分析了地方政府的这一博弈现象,认为地方政府的政策受到农民工群体的特性的影响,并给出了地方政府在政策制定过程中的建议。

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