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Caring Cooperators and Powerful Punishers: Differential Effects of Induced Care and Power Motivation on Different Types of Economic Decision Making

机译:有爱心的合作者和有力的惩罚者:诱导医疗和动力动机对不同类型经济决策的不同影响

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摘要

Standard economic theory postulates that decisions are driven by stable context-insensitive preferences, while motivation psychology suggests they are driven by distinct context-sensitive motives with distinct evolutionary goals and characteristic psycho-physiological and behavioral patterns. To link these fields and test how distinct motives could differentially predict different types of economic decisions, we experimentally induced participants with either a Care or a Power motive, before having them take part in a suite of classic game theoretical paradigms involving monetary exchange. We show that the Care induction alone raised scores on a latent factor of cooperation-related behaviors, relative to a control condition, while, relative to Care, Power raised scores on a punishment-related factor. These findings argue against context-insensitive stable preferences and theories of strong reciprocity and in favor of a motive-based approach to economic decision making: Care and Power motivation have a dissociable fingerprint in shaping either cooperative or punishment behaviors.
机译:标准的经济理论假设,决策是由稳定的,对上下文不敏感的偏好所驱动的,而动机心理学认为,决策是由具有不同的进化目标,独特的心理生理和行为方式的,对上下文敏感的动机所驱动的。为了联系这些领域并测试不同的动机如何能够差异地预测不同类型的经济决策,我们在实验参与者以参与关怀或权力动机进行实验之前,先让他们参加了一套涉及货币兑换的经典博弈论范例。我们表明,相对于控制条件,仅护理诱导一项就可以提高与合作相关行为的潜在因素的得分,而相对于护理而言,力量就可以提高一种与惩罚有关的因素的得分。这些发现与对上下文无关的稳定偏好和强互惠理论相抵触,并主张采用基于动机的经济决策方法:护理和权力动机在塑造合作或惩罚行为时具有不可分割的指纹。

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