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Eager feelings and vigilant reasons: Regulatory focus differences in judging moral wrongs

机译：渴望的情绪和保持警惕的理由：监管重点在判断道德错误方面存在差异

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For over a decade, moral psychologists have been actively researching the processes underlying moral judgments that are made intuitively without reference to an action’s concrete harms or injustice, such as the well-known case of non-procreative, consensual incest. We suggest that the reason some judge this scenario as wrong (using intuitive feelings) and others do not (using deliberative reasons) is due to an important motivational distinction. Consistent with this view, across seven studies, we demonstrate that negative judgments of such intuitive moral scenarios are more intense when processed in the promotion focus compared to the prevention focus, and that this is due to differences in whether eager (intuitive) versus vigilant (deliberative) means are employed in judging these moral wrongs. By examining various boundary conditions for this phenomenon and foundations for these judgments, we learn about the overall differences between promotion and prevention regarding how proscriptive judgments are processed, and begin to integrate these differences with existing theories in moral psychology.
机译：十多年来，道德心理学家一直在积极研究基于道德判断的过程，这些判断是直观地做出的，而不涉及行为的具体伤害或不公正现象，例如众所周知的非强制性自愿性乱伦案。我们建议，某些人认为这种情况是错误的（使用直觉），而其他人没有认为（使用商议的原因）的原因是由于重要的动机差异。与此观点相一致，在七项研究中，我们证明，与预防重点相比，在晋升重点中进行处理时，对此类直观道德情景的否定判断更加强烈，这是由于急切（直觉）与警惕（商议）手段被用来判断这些道德错误。通过研究这种现象的各种边界条件和这些判断的基础，我们了解了促进和预防之间关于如何处理命令性判断的总体差异，并开始将这些差异与道德心理学中的现有理论进行整合。

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