Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II By Ernest Sosa

Heather Battaly

摘要

Can we know that our faculties of memory, sense perception and introspectionnare reliable; and, more importantly, can we know these things without vicious circularity?nErnest Sosa’s Reflective Knowledge masterfully argues that we can. ReflectivenKnowledge is the second volume of Sosa’s two-volume tour de force on Apt Belief andnReflective Knowledge. The first volume, A Virtue Epistemology (2007) – composed ofnSosa’s Locke Lectures – focused primarily on the nature of animal knowledge as aptnbelief, and the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge.nReflective Knowledge – composed of 10 chapters, nine of which are based onnSosa’s previous work – focuses on epistemic circularity and the nature of reflectivenknowledge. Reflective Knowledge is not only a superb companion for the first volume,nbut also makes an important and much-needed contribution of its own. The problemnof epistemic circularity – of whether we can know that our faculties are reliable, whilenavoiding vicious circularity – is indeed vexing. Revised, reconstructed and collectedntogether in a single unifying volume, Sosa’s work on epistemic circularity gains newnforce. Part I evaluates six historical attempts to solve the problem of epistemic circularity,nincluding those of G.E. Moore (Ch. 1), P.F. Strawson (Ch. 3), Thomas Reidn(Ch. 4), Wilfred Sellars (Ch. 5) and Donald Davidson (Ch. 6). Sosa wholly rejectsnsome of these attempts (Strawson’s and Sellars’s), but finds seeds of truth in othersn(Moore’s, Reid’s and Davidson’s). In Part II, Sosa develops his own unique solution,nwhich employs both animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. Roughly, he arguesnthat adult humans cannot be justified in believing that (e.g.) sense perception is reliablenwithout circularity, since the justification of the belief that sense perception isnreliable will depend partly on the justification of individual perceptual beliefs, whosenjustification will depend partly on the justification of the belief that sense perception isnreliable. But he entreats us to embrace this circularity on the grounds that it is virtuous,nrather than vicious. It is virtuous, first, because sense perception is indeed reliablen(200), and its reliability partly justifies our individual perceptual beliefs – turning themninto animal knowledge; and, second, because the circularity is not linear, rather it isnthe sort of circularity that characterizes the web-like coherence necessary for reflectivenknowledge (239). Along the way, Sosa also contends that reflective knowledge isnbetter than animal knowledge (Ch. 7), and offers a solution to the problem of easynknowledge (Ch. 10). Sosa’s singular view warrants serious and sustained philosophicalnattention. His Reflective Knowledge is a major contribution to contemporarynanalytic epistemology, and is required reading for those working in the field.

机译：我们是否可以知道我们的记忆力，感觉力和内省能力是可靠的；而且更重要的是，我们能在没有恶性循环的情况下了解这些事情吗？内斯特·索萨（Nest Sosa）的反思性知识巧妙地主张我们能够做到。 ReflectivenKnowledge是Sosa的两卷关于Apt信念和nReflective Knowledge的第二卷。第一卷，《美德认识论》（2007年），由nSosa的Locke Lectures组成，主要关注动物知识的本质，即aptnief，以及动物知识和反思性知识之间的区别。nReflective知识，共10章，其中九章为基础onnSosa的先前工作–专注于认知圆度和反射性知识的性质。反思性知识不仅是第一卷的绝妙伴侣，而且本身也做出了重要而急需的贡献。认知循环的问题-我们是否可以知道我们的教师是否可靠，同时避免恶性循环-确实令人烦恼。索萨（Sosa）在认识论圆度方面的工作经过一次统一的修订，重建和收集，获得了新生力量。第一部分评估了解决认知循环问题的六种历史尝试，其中包括G.E.穆尔（Ch.1），P.F. Strawson（第3章），Thomas Reidn（第4章），Wilfred Sellars（第5章）和Donald Davidson（第6章）。索萨完全拒绝其中的一些尝试（斯特劳森和塞拉斯的尝试），但在其他人（摩尔，里德和戴维森的尝试）中找到了真理的种子。在第二部分中，Sosa开发了自己的独特解决方案，该解决方案同时利用了动物知识和反思性知识。粗略地说，他认为成年人无法相信（例如）感觉感知是可靠的而没有循环性，这是不合理的，因为认为感觉感知可靠的信念的依据将部分取决于个人感知信念的依据，其感知的依据将部分取决于认知的依据。感觉感知不可靠的信念。但是他要求我们接受这种循环性，理由是这种循环性是善良的，而不是恶性的。首先，它是有益的，因为感觉确实是可靠的（200），其可靠性在某种程度上证明了我们个人的感知信念是正确的–将人类转化为动物知识。其次，由于圆度不是线性的，而是这种圆度表征了反射性知识（239）所必需的类似网的相干性。在这一过程中，索萨还主张反思性知识比动物性知识要好（第7章），并为易知识性问题（第10章）提供了解决方案。索萨（Sosa）的奇异观点值得严肃而持续的哲学关注。他的反思性知识是对当代分析认识论的重大贡献，并且是该领域工作人员必读的书。

Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II By Ernest Sosa

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