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Investment, agency conflicts, debt maturity, and loan guarantees by negotiation

机译:投资,代理冲突,债务到期和通过谈判提供的贷款担保

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摘要

We consider an irreversible investment, of which the sunk cost is financed by a finite-term debt after entering into an option-for-guarantee swap (OGS) with negotiation. The OGS is a three-party agreement among a lender (bank), an insurer, and a borrower (entrepreneur), where the bank lends at a given interest rate to the entrepreneur and if the borrower defaults on debt, the insurer must pay all the principal and remaining interests to the lender instead of the borrower. In return for the guarantee, the borrower must allocate a perpetual American call option to purchase a fraction (guarantee cost) of his equity at a given strike price. We find that the investment threshold decreases but the exercise threshold of the insurer’s option increases with the borrower’s bargaining power. Both the investment and exercise threshold increase with debt maturity, but there is a U-shaped relation between the guarantee cost and debt maturity. The borrower postpones investment once the funding gap or project risk increases. The swap may overcome the inefficiencies from asset substitution and debt overhang, strongly depending on the debt maturity and borrower’s bargaining power.
机译:我们认为一种不可逆的投资,其中的沉没成本是在经过协商后进入有担保担保掉期(OGS)之后,由有限期债务来支付的。 OGS是贷方(银行),保险人和借款人(企业家)之间的三方协议,其中银行以给定的利率向企业家提供贷款,如果借款人违约,保险人必须偿还全部本金和剩余权益归贷方,而不是借方。作为担保的回报,借款人必须分配永久的美国看涨期权,以给定的行使价购买其权益的一小部分(担保成本)。我们发现,随着借款人的议价能力,投资门槛降低,而保险人的选择权行使门槛则提高。投资和行使门槛都随着债务期限的增加而增加,但是担保成本与债务期限之间存在U型关系。一旦资金缺口或项目风险增加,借款人便推迟投资。互换可以克服资产置换和债务过剩带来的效率低下,这在很大程度上取决于债务的到期日和借款人的议价能力。

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