• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Atlantic economic journal >Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?
【24h】

Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?

机译：政治家为什么要实施中央银行独立改革？

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

The purpose of this paper is to investigate why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to fine-tune the economy. A new data-set covering 132 countries, of which 86 countries had implemented such reforms, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country has been characterized by a high variability in historical inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.
机译：本文的目的是调查为什么全世界的政客都选择放弃对独立中央银行的权力，从而降低了他们对经济进行微调的能力。收集了涵盖132个国家的新数据集，其中86个国家进行了此类改革。非经合组织国家的政客更有可能将权力下放给独立的中央银行，前提是该国的历史通货膨胀率具有很高的波动性，而且面临更换的可能性很高。经合组织国家未发现此类影响。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号