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A metacognitive model of the sense of agency over thoughts

机译：关于思想的代理意识的元认知模型

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Introduction. The sense of agency over thoughts is the experience of oneself qua agent of mental action. Those suffering certain psychotic symptoms are thought to have a deficient sense of agency. Here I seek to explain this sense of agency in terms of metacognition. Method. I start with the proposal that the sense of agency is elicited by metacognitive monitoring representations that are used in the intentional inhibition of thoughts. I apply this model to verbal hallucinations and the like and examine the plausibility of this model explaining deficits associated with these symptoms. Results. By tying the sense of agency to metacognitive inhibition I propose that the loss of a sense of agency in certain psychotic symptoms is accompanied by a particular deficit in the patient's ability to control their own thinking. This is consistent with the experiences of those at high risk of developing hallucinations, who report more intrusive thoughts than controls. The model I present is able to explain why those at risk of developing verbal hallucinations and those suffering from verbal hallucinations have deficits in the intentional inhibition of thought. I defend this account from a possible objection by distinguishing the form of the intentional inhibition deficit displayed by those suffering verbal hallucination from that displayed by those suffering from orbital-frontal cortex lesions and posttraumatic stress disorder. Conclusion. A plausible hypothesis is that the sense of agency over thoughts is elicited by the metacognitive monitoring representation used to intentionally inhibit thoughts. The deficit in the sense of agency over thoughts associated with certain psychotic symptoms could be explained by a failure to properly metacognitively monitor certain thought processes.View full textDownload full textKeywordsMetacognition, Self-consciousness, Sense of agency over thought, Verbal hallucinationsRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546805.2011.627275
机译：介绍。超越思想的代理意识是心理行动者自身的经历。那些患有某些精神病症状的人被认为缺乏代理意识。在这里，我试图用元认知来解释这种代理感。方法。我首先提出一个建议，即通过有意识地抑制思想所使用的元认知监控表示来激发代理感。我将此模型应用于幻觉等，并检验了该模型解释与这些症状相关的缺陷的合理性。结果。通过将代理意识与元认知抑制联系起来，我提出在某些精神病性症状中丧失代理意识会伴随患者控制自己的思维能力的特定缺陷。这与发生幻觉的风险较高的人的经历相符，这些人报告的侵入性思想多于对照。我提出的模型能够解释为什么有可能发生口头幻觉的人和那些遭受口头幻觉的人在故意抑制思想方面存在缺陷。我通过将口头幻觉者表现出的故意抑制缺陷的形式与眼眶额叶皮层损伤和创伤后应激障碍者表现出的故意抑制缺陷的形式区分开来，为可能的反对辩护。结论。一个合理的假设是，对思想的代理意识是由用于故意抑制思想的元认知监控表示引起的。与某些精神病性症状相关的思想上的代理意识上的缺陷可以用未能正确地元认知地监测某些思想过程来解释。查看全文下载全文关键词认知，自我意识，代理意识上的思考，言语幻觉相关var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand：“ Taylor＆Francis Online”，servicescompact：“ citeulike，netvibes，twitter，technorati，delicious，linkedin，facebook，stumbleupon，digg，google，更多”，发布：“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”}；添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13546805.2011.627275

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