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Corporate Governance, Leadership Structure and CEO Compensation: evidence from Taiwan

机译：公司治理，领导结构和首席执行官薪酬：来自台湾的证据

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摘要

Agency theorists have put forth a number of internal control mechanisms that can reduce agency problems. These different mechanisms are substitutive and thus it is thought that both the board of directors and large external shareholders can influence CEO compensation. Stewardship theory challenges the presumption of self-interest of agency theory, holding that managers view themselves as stewards of their organisation. The first objective of this paper is to study the influence of the control of the board of directors and large external shareholders on CEO compensation. The second objective is to utilise both stewardship and agency theory to analyse the relationship between control mechanisms and compensation, and to see which theory is more applicable. This paper uses the LISREL model to study the influence that the control of the board of directors and external large shareholders has upon CEO compensation, with data drawn from samples of listed manufacturing companies between the years 1997 and 1999 in Taiwan. The following conclusions are reached: (1) the paper supports the viewpoint of stewardship theory whereby the CEO acts as a steward of his/her company when he/she also holds the position of chairman of the company. (2) The findings show that CEO compensation will be high when the board's control is relatively ineffective. (3) The shareholdings of the board of directors can reinforce the degree of control from the board.
机译：代理理论家提出了许多可以减少代理问题的内部控制机制。这些不同的机制是替代机制，因此可以认为，董事会和大型外部股东都可以影响首席执行官的薪酬。管理理论对代理理论的自我利益提出了挑战，认为管理者将自己视为组织的管理者。本文的首要目的是研究董事会和大外部股东的控制权对首席执行官薪酬的影响。第二个目标是同时利用管理理论和代理理论来分析控制机制与薪酬之间的关系，并查看哪种理论更适用。本文使用LISREL模型，研究了董事会和外部大股东的控制权对CEO报酬的影响，该数据取自1997年至1999年之间台湾台湾制造业上市公司的样本。得出以下结论：（1）该论文支持管理理论的观点，即首席执行官在兼任公司董事长的同时还担任其公司的管理人。 （2）调查结果表明，当董事会的控制相对无效时，首席执行官的薪酬将很高。 （3）董事会持股可以加强对董事会的控制程度。

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