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Channel Coordination for a Supply Chain with a Risk-Neutral Manufacturer and a Loss-Averse Retailer

机译：具有风险中性的制造商和规避损失的零售商的供应链渠道协调

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摘要

This article considers a decentralized supply chain in which a single manufacturer is selling a perishable product to a single retailer facing uncertain demand. It differs from traditional supply chain contract models in two ways. First, while traditional supply chain models are based on risk neutrality, this article takes the viewpoint of behavioral principal-agency theory and assumes the manufacturer is risk neutral and the retailer is loss averse. Second, while gain/loss (GL) sharing is common in practice, there is a lack of analysis of GL-sharing contracts in the supply chain contract literature. This article investigates the role of a GL-sharing provision for mitigating the loss-aversion effect, which drives down the retailer order quantity and total supply chain profit. We analyze contracts that include GL-sharing-and-buyback (GLB) credit provisions as well as the special cases of GL contracts and buyback contracts. Our analytical and numerical results lend insight into how a manufacturer can design a contract to improve total supply chain, manufacturer, and retailer performance. In particular, we show that there exists a special class of distribution-free GLB contracts that can coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate the expected supply chain profit between the manufacturer and retailer; in contrast with other contracts, the parameter values for contracts in this class do not depend on the probability distribution of market demand. This feature is meaningful in practice because (i) the probability distribution of demand faced by a retailer is typically unknown by the manufacturer and (ii) a manufacturer can offer the same contract to multiple noncompeting retailers that differ by demand distribution and still coordinate the supply chains.
机译：本文考虑的是分散式供应链，其中单个制造商正在将易腐产品出售给面临不确定需求的单个零售商。它在两个方面不同于传统的供应链合同模型。首先，虽然传统的供应链模型基于风险中性，但本文采用行为委托-代理理论的观点，并假设制造商是风险中性的，而零售商则是规避损失的。其次，虽然在实践中经常共享损益共享，但在供应链合同文献中缺乏对共享GL合同的分析。本文研究了总帐共享规定在减轻损失回避效应方面的作用，该效应会降低零售商的订货量和总供应链利润。我们分析的合同包括总帐共享和回购（GLB）信贷条款以及总帐合同和回购合同的特殊情况。我们的分析和数字结果有助于深入了解制造商如何设计合同以改善整个供应链，制造商和零售商的绩效。特别是，我们表明存在一类特殊的免分配GLB合同，它们可以协调供应链并在制造商和零售商之间任意分配预期的供应链利润；与其他合同相比，此类合同的参数值不取决于市场需求的概率分布。此功能在实践中很有意义，因为（i）制造商通常不知道零售商面临的需求的概率分布，并且（ii）制造商可以向多个不竞争的零售商提供相同的合同，这些合同的需求分布不同，并且仍可以协调供应链。

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