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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Systems Science and Information >Double-principal Agent: False Accounting Information, Supervision Cost and Corporate Performance
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Double-principal Agent: False Accounting Information, Supervision Cost and Corporate Performance

机译：双主代理人：虚假会计信息，监管成本和公司绩效

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摘要

The game among the corporate controlling shareholder, the shareholder in power balance and the manager can lead to severe agency problems. This paper regards the shareholder in power balance as another principal and applies the latest results about double-principal agent theory in the research of manager tunneling, supervision cost and corporate performance, trying to solve the inconsistency of the above corporate governance issue researched by domestic and foreign scholars. The main conclusions are as the followings. The correlation among them depends on which one has a dominant position, the free rider effect of supervision or the positive externality effect on cash flow right. Therefore, the key to excite the positive effect of the corporate governance mechanism such as the check-and-balance of stock ownership is the degree of cooperation between shareholders.
机译：公司控股股东，权力平衡股东和经理之间的博弈会导致严重的代理问题。本文以权力平衡中的股东为主要原则，将双主代理理论的最新成果应用到经理人隧道，监督成本和公司绩效的研究中，试图解决上述国内外研究公司治理问题的矛盾。外国学者。主要结论如下。它们之间的相关性取决于哪个人具有主导地位，监督的搭便车效应或对现金流量权的积极外部效应。因此，激发股份制制衡等公司治理机制积极作用的关键在于股东之间的合作程度。

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