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Do fiscal constraints prevent default? Historical evidence from US municipalities

机译：财政限制可以防止违约吗？来自美国市政当局的历史证据

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摘要

Through the nineteenth century numerous U.S. states developed extensive municipal fiscal constitutions. These generally came in the wake of financial crises and large-scale default of public debts. Although the constraints were imposed in order to minimize the likelihood that such outcomes would occur in the future, little work has been undertaken to analyze whether they were successful in achieving that goal. Therefore, this current study attempts to do so by empirically investigating how procedural safeguards and outright prohibitions on debt accumulation, along with hard budget constraints, and tax limits impacted the likelihood of default. This is done by evaluating municipal defaults that centered on the Panic of 1893. Overall, the results suggest that outright prohibitions on debt accumulation and hard budget constraints actually reduced the likelihood of municipal default across states, while tax limits and procedural safeguards increased that likelihood.
机译：到19世纪，美国许多州制定了广泛的市政财政宪法。这些通常是在金融危机和公共债务大规模违约之后发生的。尽管施加了限制条件是为了最大程度地减少将来发生此类结果的可能性，但很少进行工作来分析它们是否成功实现了该目标。因此，本项研究试图通过实证研究程序保护措施和对债务积累的彻底禁止以及严格的预算约束和税收限制如何影响违约的可能性来做到这一点。这是通过评估以1893年恐慌为中心的市政违约行为而完成的。总体而言，结果表明，对债务积累和硬预算约束的彻底禁止实际上降低了各州发生市政违约的可能性，而税收限制和程序性保障措施则增加了这种可能性。

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