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On the optimal design of disaster insurance in a federation

机译：联邦灾害保险的优化设计

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Recent experience with disasters and terrorist attacks in the US indicates that state and local governments rely on the federal sector for support after disasters occur. But these same governments invest in infrastructure designed to reduce vulnerability to natural and man-made hazards. We show that when the federal government is committed to full insurance against disasters, regions will have incentives to under-invest in ex-ante protective measures. We derive the structure of the optimal second-best insurance system when regional governments choose investment levels non-cooperatively and the central government cannot verify regional investment choices. For low probability disasters this will result in lower ex-post intergovernmental transfers (and hence less ex-post redistribution) and greater ex-ante investment. However, the second-best transfer scheme suffers from a time-inconsistency problem. Ex-post, the central government will be driven towards full insurance rather than the second-best grants, which results in a type of soft budget constraint problem. Sub-national governments will anticipate this and reduce their investment in protective infrastructure even further. The result is that the central government may be better off suffering the underinvestment that results with first-best transfers because investment is even lower under second-best transfers when the central government is unable to commit.
机译：美国在灾难和恐怖袭击方面的最新经验表明，灾难发生后，州和地方政府依靠联邦部门提供支持。但是这些政府对基础设施进行了投资，旨在减少对自然和人为危害的脆弱性。我们表明，当联邦政府致力于为灾害提供全面保险时，各地区将有动力在事前保护措施上投资不足。当区域政府非合作地选择投资水平而中央政府无法核实区域投资选择时，我们得出了最优第二保险制度的结构。对于低概率的灾难，这将导致较低的政府间事后转移（从而减少事后再分配）和更大的事前投资。但是，次优传输方案存在时间不一致的问题。事后，中央政府将转向全额保险，而不是次优补助金，这导致了一种软预算约束问题。地方政府将对此有所期待，并将进一步减少对保护性基础设施的投资。结果是，中央政府可能会更好地承受由第一笔最佳转移产生的投资不足，因为在中央政府无法承诺的情况下，第二笔最佳转移项下的投资甚至更低。

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