Property rights out of anarchy? The Demsetz hypothesis in a game of conflict

John R. Boyce; David M. Bruner

首页> 外文期刊>Economics of governance >Property rights out of anarchy? The Demsetz hypothesis in a game of conflict

【24h】

Property rights out of anarchy? The Demsetz hypothesis in a game of conflict

机译：产权出于无政府状态？冲突博弈中的Demsetz假设

获取原文

获取原文并翻译 | 示例

掌桥外文数据库（机构版） >>

开具论文收录证明 >>

文献代查 >>

页面导航

摘要
著录项
相似文献
相关主题

摘要

The Demsetz hypothesis states that secure claims to property arise when the value of creating those rights is sufficiently high. This paper examines the conditions under which this holds in an anarchy equilibrium in which players may allocate labor to production, to conflict, or to the public good of secure claims to property protection. In a simultaneous choice Nash equilibrium, no secure claims to property are created. However, if players play a sequential choice game in which secure claims to property protection occurs in the first stage, then the strategic benefit of reducing others' subsequent conflict allocation causes secure claims to property to arise. Secure claims to property in a social contract are imperfect, but for sufficiently high productivity of resources, the social contract welfare dominates autocracy.

机译：Demsetz假说指出，当创造那些权利的价值足够高时，就会产生对财产的担保债权。本文研究了在无政府状态下保持这种状态的条件，在这种状态下，参与者可以将劳动分配给生产，冲突或对财产保护有担保要求的公共物品。在同时选择纳什均衡时，不会创建对财产的可靠主张。但是，如果玩家玩顺序选择游戏，其中在第一阶段发生对财产保护的安全主张，那么减少他人的后续冲突分配的战略利益将导致对财产的安全主张产生。社会合同中对财产的可靠索取权并不完善，但是对于足够高的资源生产率而言，社会合同福利在独裁统治中占主导地位。

著录项

来源
《Economics of governance》 |2012年第2期|p.95-120|共26页
作者
John R. Boyce; David M. Bruner;
展开▼
作者单位

Department of Economics, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive, N.W. Calgary,Alberta T2N 1N4, Canada;

Department of Economics, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608, USA;

展开▼
收录信息
原文格式 PDF
正文语种 eng
中图分类
关键词
conflict games; demsetz hypothesis; endogenous property rights;

机译：冲突游戏;德姆塞茨假说内生产权;

相似文献

外文文献
中文文献
专利

1. Changing the rules of the game: addressing the conflict between free access to scientific discovery and intellectual property rights. [J] . Bentwich M Nature biotechnology . 2010,第2期

机译：改变游戏规则：解决自由获得科学发现与知识产权之间的冲突。
2. Assignment Games with Conflicts: Robust Price of Anarchy and Convergence Results via Semi-Smoothness [J] . Anshelevich Elliot, Postl John, Wexler Tom Theory of computing systems . 2016,第3期

机译：带有冲突的作业游戏：无政府状态的稳健价格和通过半平滑实现的收敛结果
3. Is There a Conflict Between the Protection of Indigenous Cultural Heritage Rights and the Existence and/or Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights? [J] . Judith Somaratne Intellectual property forum . 2012,第91期

机译：土著文化遗产权利的保护与知识产权的存在和/或行使之间是否存在冲突？
4. Patent Norm Conflict on Trade-Related Aspect Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) in Mining Perspective [C] . Anak Agung Sagung Ngurah Indradewi International Conference on Energy and Mining Law . 2018

机译：采矿视角下贸易相关方面知识产权（TRIPS）专利范围内
5. Artist's rights versus copyright owner's rights: Conflict resolution when the logic of intellectual property law is articulated with motion picture production, a collaborative mode of production. [D] . Larsen, Randall U. 2005

机译：艺术家的权利与版权所有者的权利：通过电影作品的生产（一种合作的生产方式）阐明知识产权法的逻辑时的冲突解决。
6. Transfer of conflict and cooperation from experienced games to new games: a connectionist model of learning [O] . Leonidas Spiliopoulos 2015

机译：冲突与合作从经验丰富的游戏转移到新游戏：学习的连接主义模型
7. The economic evolution of petroleum property rights in the United States: a test of the Demsetz hypothesis. [O] . Gary Libecap, James L. Smith 100

机译：美国石油产权的经济演变：对德姆塞茨假说的检验。

Property rights out of anarchy? The Demsetz hypothesis in a game of conflict

摘要

著录项

相似文献

相关主题

期刊订阅