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Electricity pricing under 'carbon emissions trading': A dominant firm with competitive fringe model

机译：“碳排放交易”下的电价：具有竞争优势模型的主导公司

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摘要

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of trading of CO_2 emissions allowances on electricity pricing in the short run. We mainly refer to the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and are interested in understanding the role of electricity market structures. We carry out a simple analytical model useful to verify whether (and under which conditions) the impact of the ETS under market power could be lower (or higher) than that under perfect competition. We analyze a context where generators compete in a uniform, first price auction. Market power in the form of a dominant firm facing a competitive fringe model is assumed. The paper highlights that the marginal CO_2 opportunity costs are fully included in energy prices when the electricity market is perfectly competitive. Under market power the impact of the ETS equals or exceeds that under the competitive scenario only when there is excess capacity and the share of most polluting plants in the market is low enough. Otherwise, the impact under market power is less than under perfect competition and significantly decreases in the degree of market concentration. This especially occurs when there is not high excess capacity and regardless of either the plant mix or the allowance price. In this case, moreover, the marginal pass-through rate is lower in the peak than in the off-peak hours and can be even nil if the degree of market concentration is high enough.
机译：本文的目的是分析短期内CO_2排放配额交易对电价的影响。我们主要参考欧洲排放交易计划（ETS），并且对了解电力市场结构的作用感兴趣。我们执行了一个简单的分析模型，该模型可用于验证ETS在市场力量下的影响（在何种条件下）是否比完全竞争下的影响更低（或更高）。我们分析了一种情况，即发电者在统一的首次价格拍卖中竞争。假设市场势力以主导公司的形式面对竞争性边缘模型。该论文着重指出，当电力市场完全竞争时，边际CO_2机会成本已完全包含在能源价格中。在市场支配力下，仅当产能过剩且市场上大多数污染工厂的份额足够低时，ETS的影响才等于或超过竞争情景下的影响。否则，在市场支配力下的影响将小于完全竞争下的影响，并且会大大降低市场集中度。尤其是在产能过剩不高且与工厂组合或补贴价格无关的情况下，都会发生这种情况。此外，在这种情况下，高峰时的边际通过率比非高峰时段要低，如果市场集中度足够高，则边际通过率甚至可以为零。

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