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Economic Incentives for Managing Filterable Biological Pollution Risks from Trade

机译：管理贸易中可过滤的生物污染风险的经济激励措施

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Infectious livestock disease problems are "biological pollution" problems. Prior work on biological pollution problems generally examines the efficient allocation of prevention and control efforts, but does not identify the specific externalities underpinning the design of efficiency-enhancing policy instruments. Prior analyses also focus on problems where those being damaged do not contribute to externalities. We examine a problem where the initial biological introduction harms the importer and then others are harmed by spread from this importer. Here, the externality is the spread of infection beyond the initial importer. This externality is influenced by the importer's private risk management choices, which provide impure public goods that reduce disease spillovers to others-making disease spread a "filterable externality." We derive efficient policy incentives to internalize filterable disease externalities given uncertainties about introduction and spread. We find efficiency requires incentivizing an importer's trade choices along with self-protection and abatement efforts, in contrast to prior work that targets trade alone. Perhaps surprisingly, we find these incentives increase with importers' private risk management incentives and with their ability to directly protect others. In cases where importers can spread infection to each other, we find filterable externalities may lead to multiple Nash equilibria.
机译：牲畜传染病问题是“生物污染”问题。有关生物污染问题的先前工作通常检查预防和控制工作的有效分配，但没有确定支撑提高效率的政策工具设计的具体外部性。先前的分析还着重于那些损坏不会导致外部性的问题。我们研究了一个问题，即最初的生物导入会损害进口商，然后其他人会因该进口商的传播而受到损害。在这里，外部性是指感染超出最初进口商的传播。这种外部性受进口商私人风险管理选择的影响，这些选择提供了不纯净的公共物品，减少了疾病向其他人的溢出，使疾病传播成为“可过滤的外部性”。考虑到引入和传播的不确定性，我们得出有效的政策激励措施以将可过滤疾病的外部性内部化。我们发现，与以往仅针对贸易的工作相比，提高效率需要激励进口商的贸易选择以及自我保护和减排努力。也许令人惊讶的是，我们发现这些激励措施随着进口商的私人风险管理激励措施及其直接保护他人的能力而增加。如果进口商之间可以相互传播感染，我们发现可过滤的外部因素可能导致多重纳什均衡。

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